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A Theory of Customary International Law
Jack L. Goldsmith1 & Eric A. Posner2

Customary international law (“CIL”) is one of two primary forms of international
law, the other being the treaty. CIL is typically defined as a “customary practice of
states followed from a sense of legal obligation.”3 Conventional wisdom views CIL as a
unitary phenomenon that pervades international law and international relations.
Governments take care to comply with CIL, and often incorporate its norms into
domestic statutes. National courts apply CIL as a rule of decision, or a defense, or a
canon of statutory construction. Nations argue about whether certain acts violate CIL.
Violations of CIL are grounds for war or an international claim. Legal commentators
view CIL to be at the core of the study of international law.
And yet CIL remains an enigma.4 It lacks a centralized lawmaker, a centralized
executive enforcer, and a centralized, authoritative decision-maker. The content of CIL
seems to track the interests of powerful nations. The origin of CIL rules is not
understood. We do not know why nations comply with CIL, or even what it means for
a nation to comply with CIL. And we lack an explanation for the many changes in CIL
rules over time. Both parts of CIL’s standard definition raise perennial, and
unanswered, questions. It is unclear which state acts count as evidence of a custom, or
how broad or consistent state practice must be to satisfy the custom requirement. It is
also unclear what it means for a nation to follow a custom from a sense of legal
obligation, or how one determines whether such an obligation exists.
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See G.J.H. van Hoof, Rethinking the Sources of International Law 176-178 (1983) (“confusion and divergence
of opinion . . . reign supreme as far as [CIL] is concerned”); David P. Fidler, Challenging the Classical Concept of
Custom: Perspectives on the Future of Customary International Law, 39 Ger. Y.B. Int’l L. 198, 198 (1997) (“CIL stands
at the heart of modern international law while generating frustration and frictions in its identification and
application. CIL appears indispensable and incomprehensible.”).

This article presents a theory of CIL that seeks to sort out these and many other
difficulties with the standard account of CIL. The theory uses simple game theoretical
concepts to explain how what we call CIL arises, why nations “comply” with CIL as
commonly understood, and how CIL changes.5
After briefly describing conventional wisdom about CIL in Section I, Section II
presents the theory. This theory views the behaviors that are traditionally thought to
constitute a unitary CIL as variations of one of four different behavioral logics. First,
some of what is called CIL is better thought of as behavior arising from coincidence of
interest, where behavioral regularities result from the private advantage each state
obtains from the same action regardless of the action of the other. Second, some of what
is called CIL is better thought of as arising from coercion, where a powerful state (or
coalition of states with convergent interests) forces or threatens to force other states to
engage in acts that they would not do in the absence of such force. Although we take
no position on how the label “CIL” ought to be used, scholars who use this label to refer
to behavior arising from coincidence of interest or coercion usually are under the
erroneous impression that the behavior reflects successful international cooperation.
Third are cases of true cooperation. These cases are best modeled as a bilateral
iterated prisoner’s dilemma in which two states receive relatively high payoffs over the
long term as long as both states resist the temptation to cheat in the short term. If
certain conditions are met, the resulting behavioral regularity can be one in which the
higher payoffs are obtained. Fourth, some behavioral regularities associated with CIL
can arise when states face and solve bilateral coordination problems. In these cases,
states receive higher payoffs if they take identical or symmetrical actions than if they do
not. Both cooperation and coordination can be robust in bilateral contexts, but will not
likely occur in multilateral contexts.
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Our approach has many affinities with the rational choice school in international relations. See Cooperation
Under Anarchy (ed. Kenneth Oye 1986); James Morrow, Modeling the Forms of International Cooperation:
Distribution Versus Information, 48 Int’l Org. 387 (1994); Duncan Snidal, Coordination Versus Prisoners’ Dilemma:
Implications for International Cooperation, 79 Am. Pol. Sc. Rev. 923 (1985). In recent years international law
scholarship has begun to borrow heavily from the international relations literature. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, et al.,
International Law and International Relations: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 Am. J. Int’l L.
367 (1998) (survey); Jeffrey Dunhoff & Joel Trachtman, Economic Analysis of International Law: An Invitation and a
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international law through the lens of rational choice, game theory, and related approaches. See Dunhoff &
Trachtman, supra, at __ (appendix). Michael Byers draws on the constructivist school of international relations to
gives an account of CIL that differs from ours in methodology and conclusion. See Michael Byers, Custom, Power,
and the Power of Rules, 17 Mich. J. Int’l L. 109 (1995). Fernando Teson briefly sketches a game-theoretic account of
CIL in order to criticize it on positive and especially normative grounds. See Fernando Teson, A Philosophy of
International Law 74-77 (1998).
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The theory suggests that many international behavioral regularities result from
states independently pursuing their self-interest without generating gains from
interaction. These cases are trivial and have no normative content. Some international
behavioral regularities do reflect cooperation or coordination, but the theory suggests
that these regularities will arise in bilateral, not multilateral, interactions. What appear
to be multilateral CIL norms, then, are illusions, the product of some combination of (a)
coincidence of interests among all, or almost all, states, (b) coercion by one or a few
powerful states, or (c) a prisoner’s dilemma or a coordination game played out in
discrete bilateral contexts.

This theory differs from the standard conception of CIL in several fundamental
respects. It rejects the usual explanations of CIL based on opinio juris, legality, morality,
and related concepts. States do not comply with norms of CIL because of a sense of
moral or legal obligation; rather, their compliance and the norms themselves emerge
from the states’ pursuit of self-interested policies on the international stage. In other
words, CIL is not an exogenous force that controls the behavior of states, the way
domestic law controls the behavior of citizens; it is instead a label people attach to
behavior that is generated endogenously from the interactions of states pursuing their
self-interest. In addition, our theory rejects the traditional claim that the behaviors
associated with CIL reflect a single, unitary logic. These behaviors instead reflect
various and importantly different logical structures played out in discrete, historically
contingent contexts. Finally, the theory is skeptical of the existence of law-like,
multilateral behavioral regularities that are typically thought to constitute CIL. It holds
that multinational regularities will invariably reflect coincidence of interest or coercion
(and thus not be law-like), and that regularities that reflect cooperation or coordination
arise only in bilateral contexts.
Section III tests the theory using case studies from four traditional areas of CIL:
neutrality, diplomatic immunity, prize, and maritime jurisdiction. We chose to study
these areas of the law because they represent a broad spectrum of CIL norms, and
because these CIL norms are, according to conventional accounts, among the most
robust that exist. The case studies teach several lessons. The main lesson is that CIL as
traditionally understood has little explanatory power. The international behaviors said
to constitute CIL are actually disparate and changing practices that follow different
logics depending on the interaction of state interests in particular contexts. The case
studies suggest that the behaviors associated with CIL do not reflect a unitary
underlying logic, and that CIL understood as a normative force does no independent
work in guiding national behavior. The case studies also reveal how commentators and
3

courts commit errors of induction in moving from the observation of a behavioral
regularity to the conclusion that a CIL rule exists. In addition, in analyzing CIL courts
and commentators rely too heavily on what nations say at the expense of what they do
and why they do it, and they tend to limit CIL to behavioral regularities that are “good”
from their normative perspective to be CIL, denigrating regularities that are bad as
“comity” or a violation or an exception to the CIL rule. Finally, the case studies confirm
that CIL does not reflect multilateral, law-like behavioral regularities.
Section IV considers several extensions of the analysis. It unpacks the artificial
assumption of a unitary state interest that lies at the heart of our theory. This leads us
to examine domestic constitutional arrangements that identify and enforce the national
interest implicated by CIL. Section IV also considers what our theory might teach about
the other main form of international law, the treaty. In addition, it speculates about
how our theory fits with contemporary discussions about the role of international
organizations. Finally, it examines the implications of our analysis for modern
international human rights law.
I.

Standard Views of CIL

The treaty and CIL are the two primary forms of international law. Because they
lack a centralized judicial and enforcement regime, and because violations often go
unpunished, both treaties and CIL have long been plagued by doubts about whether
they establish genuine legal obligations.6 CIL suffers additional doubts about its
legitimacy that do not burden treaties. Treaties are express promises that are almost
always embodied in written form; they often have built-in dispute resolution
mechanisms such as international arbitration; and they only bind signatories. By
contrast, CIL is unwritten; it is said to arise spontaneously from the decentralized
practices of nations; the criteria for its identification are (as we shall more fully below)
unclear; it is said to bind all nations in the world; and it does not contain within itself a
mechanism for resolving disputes and enforcing its norms. Nonetheless, conventional
wisdom holds that the obligations created by CIL bind nations with the same force as
treaties.7
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For overviews, see D.J. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law 1-15 (1998); Louis Henkin, et al,
International Law 10-41 (3d ed. 1994).
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See Restatement (Third), supra note 1, § 102 cmt. j.

4

CIL is typically defined as the collection of international behavioral regularities that
nations over time come to view as binding on them as a matter of law.8 This standard
definition contain two elements. There must be a widespread and uniform practice of
nations. And nations must engage in the practice out of a sense of legal obligation. This
second requirement, often referred to as opinio juris, is the central concept of CIL.
Because opinio juris refers to the reason why a nation acts in accordance with a
behavioral regularity, it is often described as the “psychological” element of CIL.9 It is
what distinguishes a national act done voluntarily or out of comity from one that a
nation follows because required to do so by law. Courts and scholars say that a
longstanding practice among nations “ripens” or “hardens” into a rule of CIL when it
becomes accepted by nations as legally binding.10
This standard account of CIL suffers from well-known difficulties.11 No one agrees
about which types of national actions count as state practice.12 Policy statements,
national legislation, and diplomatic correspondence are the least controversial sources.
Treaties — especially multilateral treaties, but also bilateral ones — are often used as
evidence of CIL, but in an inconsistent and under-theorized way.13 The writings of
jurists are a common but highly tendentious source of CIL.14
Even more
controversially, United Nations General Assembly Resolutions and other non-binding
statements and resolutions by multilateral bodies are often viewed as evidence of CIL.15
Those who study and use CIL – courts, arbitrators, diplomats, politicians, scholars –
invoke these sources selectively and usually tendentiously.
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See id., § 102(2) (defining CIL as “general and consistent practice that states follow from a sense of legal
obligation”); Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(b) (including within sources of international law
“international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law”).
9
See Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 7-9 (4th ed. 1990); Anthony D’Amato, The Concept
of Custom in International Law 47-55, 66-73 (1971).
10
See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900) (“By an ancient usage among civilized nations, beginning
centuries ago, and gradually ripening into a rule of international law, cost fishing vessels . . . have been recognized as
exempt . . . from capture as prize of war.”)
11
See D’Amato, supra note __; Fidler, supra note __.
12

See Fidler, supra note __, at 201-04; Brownlie, supra note __, at 5.
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See H.W.A. Thirlway, International Customary Law and Codification 80-94 (1972); Wolfke, supra note __, at

68-72.
14

See, for example, Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1995); see generally Brownlie, supra note __, at
24-25 (noting reasons for “caution” in using publicists as a source of law); G.J.H. van Hoof, Rethinking the Sources of
International Law 176-178 (1983) (explaining and criticizing role of publicists).
15
For analyses of the significance for CIL of General Assembly Resolutions, see Oscar Schacter, International
Law in Theory and Practice, 178 Res. des Cours 111-121 (1982-V); Wolkfke, supra note __, at 84; Stephen M. Schwebel,
The Effect of Resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly on Customary International Law, 1979 Proc. Am. Soc. Int’l L.
301.
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No one, moreover, agrees about how widespread and uniform state practice must
be. In theory the practice is supposed to be “general” in the sense that all or almost all
of the nations of the world engage in it.16 But it is practically impossible to determine
whether 190 or so nations of the world engage in a particular practice. CIL is thus
usually based on a highly selective survey of state practice that includes major powers
and interested nations.17 Increasingly, courts and scholars sometimes ignore the state
practice requirement altogether.18 For example, they refer to a CIL prohibition on
torture at the same time that they acknowledge that many nations of the world torture
their citizens.19 It is thus unclear when, and to what degree, the state practice
requirement must be satisfied.
To what does the
The opinio juris requirement raises more problems.20
psychological state refer? How does one identify it? There are no settled answers.
Courts and scholars sometimes infer it from the existence of a widespread behavioral
regularity.21 But if opinio juris can be inferred from behavioral regularities, it is
redundant with the requirement of a widespread and uniform state practice, which, by
concession, is insufficient by itself to establish CIL. To avoid this problem, courts and
scholars sometimes (but only sometimes) require independent evidence that a nation
acted from a sense of obligation, such as a statement by an important government
official, ratification of a treaty that contains a norm similar to the CIL norm in question,
or an attitude of approval toward a General Assembly Resolution.22 The appropriate
conditions on the use of such evidence remains unsettled, and indeed the evidence is
never considered in a systematic fashion.
These definitional problems with opinio juris flow in part from more serious
conceptual difficulties. There is no convincing explanation of the process by which a

16

See Brownlie, supra note __, at 5-6.

17

See Wolfke, supra note __, at 78-79; Jonathan Charney, Universal International Law, 87 Am. J. Int’l L. 529,
537 (1993).
18
See Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A
Critique of the Modern Position, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 815, 839-40 (1997).
19
See Filartiga v. Penal-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882 (2d Cir. 1980); Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of
Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles, 12 Austl. Y.B. Int’l L. 82, 90 (1992).
20
See Thirlway, supra note, at 47 (“The precise definition of the opinio juris, the psychological element in the
formation of custom, the philosopher’s stone which transmutes the inert mass of accumulated usage into the gold of
binding legal rules, has probably caused more academic controversy than all the actual contested claims made by
states on the basis of alleged custom, put together.”).
21
See Brownlie, supra note __, at 7 (citing examples).
22

Id. at 7-9 (citing examples).
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voluntary behavioral regularity transforms itself into a binding legal obligation.23
Opinio juris is described as the psychological component of CIL because it refers to an
attitude that nations supposedly have toward a behavioral regularity. The idea is
mysterious because the legal obligation is created by a nation’s belief in the existence of
the legal obligation. As D’Amato notes, this is circular reasoning.24 Opinio juris is really
a conclusion about a practice’s status as international law; it does not explain how a
widespread and uniform practice becomes law.
We have described some of the many uncertainties that bedevil the standard
conception of CIL. These problems are well known. They are the subject of an
enormous literature that endlessly (and in our opinion unproductively) debates
definitional issues, the relative significance of practice and opinio juris, and other
conceptual matters internal to the traditional account.25 Although our theory has
implications for many of these issues, such issues are not the main focus of our analysis.
Instead, we focus on two sets of issues that are rarely discussed in the international law
literature, but that are fundamental to understanding CIL.
The first set of issues concerns the unarticulated and undefended assumptions that
underlie the traditional conception of CIL. Despite the many disagreements within the
traditional paradigm, the parties to this debate assume that CIL is unitary, universal, and
exogenous. CIL is unitary in the sense that all the behaviors it describes have an identical
logical form that is described in the standard definition. CIL is universal in the sense
that its obligations bind all nations except those that “persistently object” during the
development of the CIL norm.26 And CIL is an exogenous influence on national
behavior in the sense that it guides, shapes, and influences national actions. When
nations are law-abiding they conform their behavior to CIL. When they violate CIL
they act in defiance of it. Our theory of CIL challenges each of these assumptions.
The second set of issues on which we focus concerns the traditional paradigm’s
inability to explain international behavior. For example, the traditional paradigm has

23

For a catalogue of failed attempts, see D’Amato, supra note __, at 47-56, 66-72.

24

D’amato captures this circularity with a question: “How can custom create law if its psychological
component requires action in conscious accordance with law preexisting the action”? D’Amato, supra note __, at 66.
He analyzes the many futile attempts to avoid this paradox, id. at 47-56, 66-68.
25
The canonical treatments of CIL include D’Amato, supra note __; Wolfke, supra note __; Thirlway, supra
note __; and Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, 47 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 1 (1974-1975).
26
On the persistent objector rule, see Restatement (Third), supra note __, at § 102, comment d; Ted L. Stein,
The Approach of the Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent Objector in International Law, 26 Harv. Int’l
L. J. 457 (1985).
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no account for how CIL originates.27 It does not explain how international behavioral
regularities emerge from disorder. As we saw above, it also fails to explain how nations
move from a “mere” behavioral regularity to a behavioral regularity that nations follow
from a sense of legal obligation.
The traditional account cannot explain how CIL rules change over time.28 To take
one of scores of examples: the ostensible CIL rule governing a nation’s jurisdiction over
its coasts changed from a cannon-shot rule to a three-mile rule to a twelve mile rule
with many qualifications.29 On the traditional account, the process of change is
necessarily illegal, since some states must initiate a departure from the prior regularity
that they were bound to follow as a matter of law. More broadly, the traditional
account does not explain why CIL changes track the interests of powerful nations, or
why technological changes and other exogenous factors often produce significant
changes in the content of CIL.
The traditional account also cannot explain several pervasive features of the way
nations perceive and use CIL. It cannot account for the fact that nations frequently
change their views about the content of CIL, often during very short periods of time.30
Nor, relatedly, can it explain why courts and politicians almost always apply a
conception of CIL that is in the nation’s best interest.31 It also does not explain why
nations often say that they will abide by a particular norm of CIL, and then violate their
promises.32
Finally, the traditional account does not explain why nations comply with CIL. Why
would a nation ever comply with CIL when it is not in its interest to do so? The
traditional account assumes that this is what nations do when they appear to act in
accordance with CIL. But as noted above, opinio juris begs the question of why nations
feel obliged to obey CIL. Moreover, the traditional theory does not explain why, if
nations obey CIL from a sense of legal obligation, they ever violate CIL.

27

See D’Amato, supra note __, at 4.

28

See id.; Hoof, supra note __, at 97-105.

29

This is a simplification. We explore this rule more fully infra.

30

For examples, see infra __.

31

For examples, see infra __.

32

For examples, see infra __.
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There are numerous more general theories about why nations obey international
law.33 The large majority of these theories focus exclusively on, and have relevance
only for, treaties.34 But some purport to apply to treaties and CIL alike. Some positivist
theorists argue that nations obey international law -- including CIL -- because they
consent to it.35 But as many have noted, this position begs the question of why nations
abide by the international rules to which they have consented.36 A prominent theory in
the natural law tradition contends that nations abide by CIL because “they perceive the
rule and its institutional penumbra to have a high degree of legitimacy,” where
legitimacy is understood as “a property of a rule or rule-making institution which itself
exerts a pull toward compliance on those addressed normatively because those
addressed believe that the rule or institution has come into being and operates in
accordance with generally accepted principles or right process.”37 Another theory
argues that “repeated compliance [with international law] becomes habitual obedience”
as international law “penetrates into a domestic legal system, thus becoming part of that
nation’s internal value set.”38 Yet another prominent theory purports to begin from the
more rationalistic premise that nations “observe international obligations unless
violation promises an important balance of advantage over cost,” but ultimately
explaining international compliance on the basis of morality and the “habit and inertia
of continued compliance.”39 “Right process,” “value set,” “habit,” and “morality” are
empty phrases in these theories. They stand in for the concept of opinio juris without
explaining what it means.

33

For a comprehensive survey, see Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 Yale
L. J. 2608 (1997); see also Oscar Schacter, Towards a Theory of International Obligation , 8 Va. J. Int’l L. 300, 301 (1968)
(earlier survey noting “[n]o single theory [of international obligation] has received general agreement and sometimes
it seems as though there are as many theories or at least formulations as there are scholars”). Most of the literature
canvassed in Koh, supra, limits itself to treaty compliance.
34
To take a prominent recent example, the Chayes’ management theory only purports to account for
international regulatory regimes established by treaty. See Abraham Chayes and Antonia Chayes, The New
Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements (1995). In addition, all of the recent empirical
work on compliance with international law has focused on treaties rather than CIL. See Harold Hongju Koh, Why
Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 Yale L. J. 2599, 2599 n. 2 (1997). For our account of why treaties might
foster international cooperation more successfully than CIL, see infra __.
35
See J. Brierly, The Law of Nations, 53-56 (6th ed. 1963).
36

See id.

37

Thomas Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions 24-25 (1995).

38

Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 Yale L. J. 2599, 2603 (1997).

39

Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave 49, 58-63 (2d ed 1979). The rational choice strand of international
relations attempts to explain international cooperation without falling back on notions of morality or opinio juris. See
sources cited supra note __. As we explained in note __, this is the tradition we are working in, a tradition that has
not to date been invoked to account for CIL.
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There are scores of other theories of international law compliance.40 This is not the
place to catalog these theories’ many shortcomings, at least as applied to CIL. Most of
them suffer from the difficulties described above.
They provide accounts of
international behavioral regularities at very high levels of generality; they view
international law as an exogenous influence on international behavior rather than
explaining it or why nations obey it; they do not account for when or why nations
violate the international law; and they do not explain how international law originates
or changes.
II.

A Revisionist Theory

This Section sets forth our revisionist theory of CIL. The theory uses simple game
theoretical concepts to explain international behavioral regularities as a function of
nations pursuing self-interest.41 We argue that nations pursuing self-interest produce
behavioral regularities in four strategic situations: coincidence of interest, coercion, the
bilateral iterated prisoner’s dilemma, and coordination. All of the international behaviors
subsumed by the label CIL are variations on one of these four strategic forms. In
contrast to the traditional understanding of CIL, the theory rejects the notion that
international behavioral regularities result from compliance with a norm that a nation
feels legally obliged to follow. It claims that the direction of causality is the reverse. It
is not the case that an exogenous, reified entity known as CIL causes nations to act in
certain ways; rather, CIL is the label people attach to behavioral regularities that arise
endogenously from the interaction of nations pursuing their self-interest.
A word of caution is in order at the outset concerning our use of concepts from
game theory. We use these concepts to organize our ideas and intuitions and to clarify
the assumptions made by us and those we criticize. We do not claim that the axioms of
game theory accurately represent the decision-making process of a “state” in all its
complexity.42 Because the premises of the theory are relatively crude, the theory’s
predictions lack nuance and subtlety. But a theory is successful if it provides a more
coherent and plausible account of behavior than rival theories do, and if it allows one to

40

Schacter, supra note __, at 301, lists thirteen theories. Koh, supra note __, canvasses dozens.

41

Discussions of the game theoretic concepts we use can be found in standard game theory textbooks. Two
particularly lucid and relevant treatments are Douglas G. Baird, Robert H. Gertner, and Randal C. Picker, Game
Theory and the Law (1994), which shows how game theory can be used to understand law (but not international
law), and James D. Morrow, Game Theory for Political Scientists (1994), which shows how game theory can be used
to understand international relations. Another useful reference is Oye, supra note __.
42
We explore this issue further in Section IVA.
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see old problems in new and fruitful ways.43 The success of our argument, then,
depends on both its theoretical plausibility (the subject of this Section) and its empirical
implications (the subject of the next Section).
A. The Basic Model.
What courts and scholars call CIL refers to certain behavioral regularities that
emerge in international games played among states. In this Section we describe the four
strategic positions that we believe capture the behavioral regularities thought to
constitute CIL. For expository clarity, we initially discuss interactions between two
states; then, we discuss the extent to which the conclusions of this discussion can be
extended to interactions among more than two states. We then explain how the basic
model differs from the traditional conception of CIL.
1. Coincidence of Interest
The first position is one of coincidence of interest, where states engage in behavioral
regularities simply because each obtains private advantages from the same action
irrespective of the action of the other. Table 1 illustrates such a situation.
Table 1

attack
ignore

attack
-2, -2
2, -1

ignore
-1, 2
3, 3

Table 1 might describe the position of two belligerent states that have navies that
patrol a body of water also used by civilian fishing boats from both states. A state’s
naval vessels are expensive to operate and have important uses (such as protecting the
state from invasion), and the fishing boats are not worth very much. Payoffs in Table 1
are based on the assumptions that a state enjoys a payoff of 3 if it neither attacks the
boats of the other state nor is subject to an attack; the state incurs a cost of 1 in order to
seize the fishing boats of the other state; and the state loses 1 if its fishing boats are
attacked.

43

For a discussion of the advantages and limitations of using game theory to analyze international relations,
see Duncan Snidal, The Game Theory of International Politics, in Oye, supra note __; and for more general critical
comments, see David M. Kreps, Game Theory and Economic Modelling ch. 5 (1990).
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To determine the equilibrium of the game, assume first that one player (“state j”)
attacks the boats of the other player (“state i”). State i obtains a higher payoff (2) if its
navy does not attack the fishing boats of state j, than it obtains if it does attack and seize
these boats (-2). Now assume that state j does not attack the boats of state i. State i
obtains a higher payoff (3) if it ignores than if it attacks (-1). Accordingly, state i ignores
state j’s boats regardless of state j’s behavior. Because state j’s payoffs are the same as
state i’s, state j ignores state i’s boats as well. Thus, in equilibrium each state ignores the
boats of the other state. By an “equilibrium,” we mean that the states will continue
engaging in this behavior as long as payoffs do not change. Thus, when an equilibrium
occurs, one would observe a behavior regularity -- in this case, a behavioral regularity
consisting of each state ignoring the boats of the other.
This behavioral regularity is one possible explanation for what is referred to as
CIL.44 Notice that in equilibrium the states act according to their self-interest.
Although an observer might applaud the outcome because the states refrain from
belligerence, the outcome is no more surprising than the fact that states do not sink their
own ships. States independently pursuing their own interests will engage in
symmetrical or identical actions which do not cause harm to anyone, simply because
the states gain nothing by deviating from those actions.
2.

Coercion

A second type of strategic position in which states find themselves can be called
coercion. One state, or a coalition of states with convergent interests, force other states to
engage in actions that serve the interest of the first state or states. To understand this
strategic situation, imagine a game in which a large and powerful state initially can
threaten to punish (or not) any small state that engages in any action X. The small state
then chooses whether to engage in the action or not, and the large state responds by
punishing the small state or not. The game then repeats itself. The large state receives
its highest payoff if the small state does not engage in X, and the cost of punishing the
small state is trivial. The small state receives a higher payoff if it does not engage in X
and is not punished, than if it does engage in X and is punished. In equilibrium the
large state makes the threat, the small state does not engage in X, and the large state
does not punish the small state. The small state does not deviate because the large state
44

Cf. Kenneth A. Oye, Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies 6, in Oye, supra
note __. Oye argues that states often obtain mutual gains by acting independently, and refers to the classical liberal
defense of free trade, according to which every state does best if it eliminates tariffs regardless of whether other states
do. The example is slightly misleading, because gains exist only against the implicit baseline of protectionism. Our
example, below, of states not sinking their own ships is formally identical, except self-interest leads to maintenance of
the status quo rather than “mutual gains” except in the most attenuated sense.
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would punish it if it did. If the small state did deviate, the large state would punish the
small state, because the cost of punishment is low and otherwise the large state’s threats
would have no effect on behavior in future rounds.45
As an example, suppose that state i, a large and powerful nation, wishes to prevent
small state j from attacking i’s civilian fishing boats. State i threatens state j by
announcing that if state j does not stop its attacks, state i will destroy j’s navy. If state i
cares enough about preventing j’s attacks, and the cost of punishing state j is low
enough, state i’s threat will be credible, and state j will cease attacking the fishing
vessels. If, for its own reasons, state i does not attack state j’s fishing boats, then
observers will perceive a behavioral regularity consisting of states i and j not attacking
each other’s civilian fishing boats. They may conclude that a rule of CIL prohibits the
seizure of fishing boats. But this harmonious result is produced by force.46 Indeed, the
application of force is more obvious when the weak party is passive. For example, state
i might seize colonies of state j and threaten j with destruction if j resists. Observers
might hesitate about calling the outcome a norm of CIL, but the structure of the game is
identical to that of the first example.
Coercion and coincidence of interest differ according to the degree to which a state’s
best action depends on the action of the other state. Coincidence of interest exists when
a state’s best action is independent of the action of the other state. Coercion exists when
the weak state’s best action depends on the strong state’s action, and the strong state
would punish the weak state if the weak state chose the action that does not maximize
the strong state’s payoff.

45

This game is based on models of entry deterrence in industrial organization. In those models, a firm or
entrepreneur must decide whether to enter a market dominated by a monopolist, then the monopolist must decide
whether to retaliate by cutting prices and expanding production. Several different models show that the monopolist
can deter entry either by making a credible threat that it will cut prices or by in fact cutting prices prior to entry. In
the simplest model, which we use in the text, the monopolist cuts prices after entry in order to show future entrants
that it will retaliate. In another model, some monopolists are irrational (or prone to bad judgment) and others are
rational; irrational monopolists retaliate by cutting prices in the second period, while rational monopolists mimic the
irrational monopolist in order to deter future entrants. In a signaling model, the entrant does not know whether the
monoplist has high or low costs, and the low-cost monopolist signals its low costs by charging low prices. In
international relations, the analogies would be (i) powerful states sometimes being spiteful or irrational, and
attacking weak states that do not do their bidding even though the cost of attacking them exceeds the benefit of
successful coercion in a single round; or (ii) some powerful states having cheaper militaries than others, and
occasionally engaging in gratuitous displays of military might in order to reveal this private information to weaker
countries. For discussions of the predatory pricing literature, see Baird et al., supra note __ at 178-86, and Jean Tirole,
The Theory of Industrial Organization 367-74 (1997).
46
Alternatively, the large state might promise to give money to the small state if it stops seizing fishing boats.
The strategic structure of the game is the same whether the large state makes a threat or offers a bribe, the difference
being whether the outcome for the small state is better or worse than the status quo.
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3.

Cooperation

The third basic type of strategic position in which states find themselves is that of
the bilateral repeat prisoner’s dilemma. Table 2 illustrates one stage of such a game.
Table 2

attack
ignore

attack
2, 2
1, 4

ignore
4, 1
3, 3

Consider the differences between this example and the coincidence of interest
example. With coincidence of interest the state incurs a cost of 1 in order to attack
fishing vessels and gains nothing. Here, the state incurs a cost of 1 and gains 2, while a
state loses 2 if it is attacked. The coincidence of interest situation might correspond to
modern conditions, when it is costly to operate a navy and the gains from seizing an
enemy’s civilian fishing boats are quite low, because they are worth very little as prizes
or as means for disrupting the enemy’s economy. The prisoner’s dilemma example
might correspond to conditions under which it is not so costly to operate a navy and
fishing boats are valuable or play an important role in the enemy’s economy. The
analysis of this example is familiar. State i obtains a higher payoff from seizing state j’s
fishing boats, regardless of whether state j also seize state i’s boats (2>1) or not (4>3).
State j’s payoffs are symmetrical. Therefore, if Table 2 describes the whole game, and
there is no possibility of future action or international sanctions, both states will seize
the fishing boats of the other, and the jointly minimizing outcome is obtained.
As is well known, when the prisoner’s dilemma is repeated over an indefinite period
of time, the optimal outcome ((ignore, ignore) in our case) becomes possible in each
round.47 Thus, one might hypothesize that each state will ignore the other state’s
fishing boats as long as the states expect to interact with each other over time. If they
do so, the resulting equilibrium might be described as a norm of CIL. But many
conditions must be satisfied before this result can be achieved.48

47

See standard game theory texts such as Baird et al., supra note __, and Robert Gibbons, Game Theory for
Applied Economists 82-99 (1992).
48
The conditions examined in the paragraphs that follow are standard in the game theory literature. For more
detailed discussions, see Baird et al, supra note __, at 165-78; Morrow, supra note __, at 260-79.
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First, the players must have sufficiently low discount rates: they care about the
future relative to the present.49 Individuals who are impulsive or impatient or who do
not care about the future have high discount rates. Such individuals cannot cooperate
in an iterated prisoner’s dilemma because they cannot resist cheating in round n, rather
than in round n+1, so their threat to punish the other party in round n+1 if the latter
cheats in round n is not credible. The international analogy to the impulsive individual
is the rogue state. Rogue states are states controlled by irrational or impulsive leaders, or
states with unstable political systems, or states in which citizens do not enjoy stable
expectations. Such states can be modeled as having high discount rates. Ordinary
states will not cooperate with rogue states for the same reason that disciplined
individuals do not cooperate with impulsive individuals: they do not trust them.
Second, the game must continue indefinitely, in the sense that players expect it
either never to end or to end only with a sufficiently low probability.50 Care should be
taken when analyzing the parameters of a game. Norms of war (such as the humane
treatment of prisoners) might exist because (a) belligerents foresee interaction ceasing at
the end of the war but do not know when the war will end, and refrain from “cheating”
during the war (such as killing prisoners) in the expectation that the enemy will do the
same; (b) belligerents foresee interaction continuing after the war ends, and fear that
“cheating” during the war may invite retaliation after the war; or (c) belligerents care
about their reputation among neutrals, and fear that neutrals will interpret their failure
to abide by the norms of war as an indication that they have low discount rates and
thus are untrustworthy partners for alliances. This last possibility requires a more
complicated model, and we will analyze such a model in Section II.C. For present
purposes, it is sufficient to note that analysis of customs between states, such as their
treatment of each other’s civilian fishing vessels, should not overlook the influence of
future interaction between the states outside the narrow context of the game.
Third, the payoffs from defection must not be too high relative to the payoffs from
cooperation. Notice that because payoffs may change over time, a relationship may
succeed for a while and then, after a sudden change in payoffs, collapse. Imagine two
neighboring states that do not seize each other’s fishing boats in a repeat game
characterized by stage games with the payoffs described in Table 2. State i receives (2 +
49

Discount rate refers to the degree to which a person prefers current payoffs to future payoffs. Suppose a
person expects to receive $100 in one year. A person with a high discount rate of, say, 0.5 is indifferent between that
amount in one year and about $67 today. A person with a low discount rate of, say, 0.1 is indifferent between that
amount in one year and about $91 today. See Gibbons, supra note __ at 68-69 n.7.
50
In more sophisticated analyses, this is not required: it is sufficient if players believe the game will not end
for a long time and there is a small probability that a player is irrational or will make an error. See Morrow, supra
note __ at 283-91.
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d2 + d22 + ...) from cooperating, which exceeds the payoff from cheating on the first
round assuming that State j plays the “grim” strategy and retaliates by refusing to
cooperate in all future rounds (4 + 0 + 0 + ...), given a sufficiently high d, where d refers
to the discount factor.51 Suppose that because of an exogenous change the one-time
payoff from cheating rises to 100. Then, given the right d, State i will cheat rather than
cooperate, and State j will retaliate by cheating. Cooperation disappears.
Fourth, players must choose sufficiently cooperative strategies, such as tit-for-tat or
a variant. Strategies that are too forgiving invite exploitation; strategies that are too
nasty risk a breakdown in cooperation. If states initially choose strategies randomly,
and then less successful states imitate the strategies of more successful states, then it is
plausible that over time the better strategies will drive out the worse strategies.52
Fifth, the action that will overcome the prisoner’s dilemma must be clear, and
identical or symmetrical. Not seizing fishing vessels is clear and identical for both
states. If, however, the optimal action were seizing fishing vessels 32 percent of the
time, the action would not be clear — and if it were 32 percent for one state and 47
percent for other, it would not be identical or symmetrical. There must be a “focal
point” that determines the optimal action (more about which below); otherwise, the
states cannot coordinate on a solution to the prisoner’s dilemma without a treaty or
formal understanding.53
The bilateral prisoner’s dilemma results in a jointly maximizing outcome only if
these conditions are met. By contrast, the coincidence of interest case results in the
jointly maximizing outcome regardless of whether these conditions are met. Thus, the
value-maximizing equilibrium in the bilateral prisoner’s dilemma is not as robust. But
by the same token, it is not banal. It reflects true international cooperation and thus
seems much more law-like than the equilibrium that results from coincidence of
interest, at least if we are to restrict the term “international law” to circumstances in
which states interact and their interactions matter.
The bilateral repeat prisoner’s dilemma differs from the coercion case along two
dimensions. First, the cooperative equilibrium (in the first game) depends on both
states threatening each other with deviation rather than just the more powerful state (in
the second game) threatening the weaker state with punishment if it deviates. Second,
both states prefer the equilibrium that is sustained by threats to the equilibrium that
51

If r is the discount rate, d=1/(1+r). See Gibbons, supra note __ at 68-69 n.7.

52

See Axelrod, supra note __.

53

On focal points, see Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict 57 (1960).
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results when both states deviate (in the first game), rather than just the more powerful
state preferring the equilibrium that is sustained by its threats and the weaker state
preferring the equilibrium in which the threat is not credible and not carried out (in the
second game). Everything else being equal, the coercion equilibrium might seem more
robust than the cooperative equilibrium, because the former requires only the powerful
state’s threat to be credible, whereas the latter requires both states’ threats to be
credible.
4.

Coordination.

The fourth strategic position in which states find themselves is one of coordination.
In the pure two-state coordination game, the states’ interests converge, like the case of
coincidence of interest; but unlike the latter case, each state’s best move depends on the
move of the other state. Consider Table 3.
Table 3

action X
action Y

action X
3, 3
0, 0

action Y
0, 0
3, 3

Each state prefers to engage in X if the other state engages in X, and each state
prefers to engage in Y if the other state engages in Y. There are two Pareto-optimal
pure-strategy equilibria: {X,X} and {Y,Y}. Once the states coordinate on one action,
neither state will deviate. The main problem is that of the first move. If state i does not
know whether state j will choose X or Y, then state i does not know whether to choose X
or Y. Both states might choose their first and subsequent moves at random, resulting in
a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which the parties fail to obtain the full gains from
coordination.54
A simple example is coordination on a border between two states. Suppose that
action X is “patrol up to the river,” and action Y is “patrol up to the road.” The river
and road cross but divide the territory evenly. The states are indifferent about whether
the river or the road should divide their territories, but want to avoid conflicts between
their patrols. Once it is established that the equilibrium action is X (or Y), neither state
will deviate from that action. To see why, suppose that state i knows that state j
engages in X. Then state i does better by also engaging in X than by engaging Y. If

54

For a discussion, see Baird et al., supra note __ at 40.
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instead state i believes that state j engages in Y, state i does better by engaging in Y than
by engaging in X.
Coordination problems also arise as in the course of solving the repeat prisoner’s
dilemma. Although repeat play can overcome the incentives to cheat in one round of
the prisoner’s dilemma, there remains a problem of coordination over which moves
count as cooperative moves and which moves count as defections. For example, part of
state i’s and state j’s problem in overcoming the incentives to seize each other’s fishing
vessels involves identifying which seizures are permitted and which are not permitted.
Can one seize a fishing vessel if it contains spies? What if the sailors are not spies but
have observed secret maneuvers? Why is it that states may seize large commercial
ships but not small vessels, and how does one draw the line? A repeated prisoner’s
dilemma, when discount rates are low enough, is not the same thing as a one-shot
prisoner’s dilemma, but is instead a kind of coordination game.55
If states hold different expectations about what counts as cooperation, cooperation
will not get started or will break down. Suppose, for example, that states i and j
cooperate by not seizing each other’s small coastal fishing vessels. As a result of
technological and economic change, civilians on both sides begin to sail large fishing
vessels in the coastal waters. State i assumes that such vessels are fair game, because
they are large; state j assumes that such vessels are protected, because they stick to the
coast. When state i’s navy seizes one such vessel innocently, state j misinterprets this
action as defection and responds by seizing state i’s small coastal fishing vessels. Then
state i will retaliate, and cooperation will break down. In the absence of communication
(on which, see below), cooperation in the repeat prisoner’s dilemma is likely to fail if
rapid technological and economic change frequently alters the parties’ expectations or
creates ambiguity about the meaning of their actions.56
5.

On the Possibility of Multinational CIL Norms

One of the central claims of the standard account of CIL is that CIL norms govern all
or almost all states, or at least all “civilized” states. This universality claim is rarely
55

See Baird et al., supra note __, at 173-74; Morrow, supra note __, at 267-68.
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There are many variations on the pure coordination game. One equilibrium might produce higher payoffs
for both parties than the other; then coordination may be easy. Or each party does better in a different pure-strategy
equilibrium, in which case coordination may be very difficult. This is the “Battle of the Sexes” game. Morrow
analyzes the treaty on wireless communications as a Battle of the Sexes game, because all states preferred
coordinating on some standard rather than on none, but some standards benefitted some states more than others.
See James D. Morrow, Modelling the Forms of International Cooperation: Distribution Versus Information, 48 Intern’l
Org. 387 (1994).
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explained further. The idea is probably that certain public goods can be created only if
all or most states participate by engaging in certain actions that they would not engage
in if they acted independently. World peace, the preservation of the ozone layer, the
maintenance of international fisheries, and coordination on standards for international
communication and transportation are examples of such public goods. International
scholars appear to believe that CIL norms evolve in order to enable states to create these
n-state public goods.
Our theory rejects this view. It holds that most instances of spontaneous
international cooperation arise as the result of pairwise interactions. Apparently
cooperative universal behavioral regularities are illusory, the result of identical pairwise
interactions, coincidence of interest, or coercion. When n-state public goods are created,
it is because states enter treaties and other agreements that solve n-state coordination
games, not because of the evolution of universal and exogenous CIL norms.
To understand the illusory quality of universal CIL norms, imagine that we observe
that no state seizes civilian fishing vessels from enemies in times of war. The theory
contemplates many possible explanations for this observation.
First, states do not seize fishing boats because of coincidence of interest. The nations
do not seize boats because their navies are more effectively used by attacking enemy
warships or large merchant vessels. Second, many nations receive no benefit from
seizing fishing boats, and those that otherwise would receive a benefit are deterred
from doing so by powerful nations that have an interest in preventing seizures of their
own boats. Third, two nations decline to seize fishing boats in a bilateral repeat
prisoner’s dilemma, and all the other nations decline to do so because of coincidence of
interest (or coercion), or -- it is possible -- all or most nations face each other in exclusive
bilateral repeat prisoner’s dilemmas and refrain from seizing fishing vessels because of
fear of retaliation from their (single) opponent. For example, all bodies of water
containing fish under the conditions described above are bordered by exactly two
states. Fourth, some or all nations face each other in bilateral coordination games which
they solve, while any other nations engage in the same action because of coincidence of
interest, coercion, or their participation in a bilateral prisoner’s dilemma. There are
numerous other possible combinations of coincidence of interest, coercion, bilateral
prisoner’s dilemmas, and bilateral coordination. In all these cases, some or many states
refrain from seizing fishing vessels because they have better uses for their navy, or
because they fear retaliation from the state whose fishing vessels they covet. In none of
these cases is an n-state public good created through multilateral cooperation.
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Our essential claim is that all examples of robust CIL norms are explained in these
ways. Although states often engage in virtually identical behavior -- protecting foreign
ambassadors, for example57 -- they do so because they have no interest in deviating or
because they fear retaliation from the state they victimize. The norm is universal in a
trivial sense only, like the norm that states do not drill holes in the bottoms of their own
ships; it does not reflect true multilateral cooperation.
But what is the basis for our skepticism about the spontaneous evolution of true
multilateral cooperation? To answer this question, we focus on the assumptions
necessary to explain multilateral cooperation in repeat prisoner’s dilemmas and in
coordination games.
The n-state repeat prisoner’s dilemma should be sharply distinguished from the 2state version of this game. An example of the n-state game is a fishery surrounded by
many states, as opposed to a fishery (in a small lake, for example) that is surrounded
and controlled by only two states. Table 2, which was used to illustrate the 2-state
prisoner’s dilemma, can also be used to illustrate the n-state version, except with the
interpretation that the row player represents any given state, and the column player
represents all the other states. Each state does better by overfishing, whether or not
other states overfish; therefore, all states will overfish. One might ask whether the state
would refrain from overfishing in order to avoid retaliation by other states. The fishery
could be preserved if all states adopt the strategy of, for example, “overfishing for all
future rounds if any single state overfishes in any round.”58 This draconian strategy,
however, would result to the depletion of the fishery if any single state cheated, or even
if a single state mistakenly believed that another state cheated. Recall also that we are
talking here about the evolution of a CIL norm, so the states would all have to adopt
this strategy, rather than any of the indefinitely large number of alternatives, in order
for cooperation to succeed. Probably for these reason, we do not observe such
draconian strategies in the real world. Although game theory does not rule out the
possibility of n-state cooperation, the assumptions required for such an outcome are
quite strong and unrealistic. For this reason, we doubt the utility of n-player prisoner’s
dilemmas as an explanation for multilateral or “universal” behavioral regularities.59
Similar comments apply to n-state coordination games. Examples of n-state
coordination problems include the division of the world into time zones and the choice
57

See infra __.
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See Michihiro Kandori, Social Norms and Community Enforcement, 59 Rev. Econ. Stud. 63 (1992), on nplayer prisoner’s dilemmas.
59
This skepticism is shared by others. See, for example, Oye, supra note __, at 7.
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of international communication standards. In the latter case, every state wants to
facilitate communication between its citizens and citizens of other states, but they must
agree on where phone lines hook up, or which part of the spectrum will be used for
radio transmissions. Once a particular standard is established, no state gains anything
from deviating from it. If everyone is communicating by using one technology, a state
gains nothing by switching to another technology while losing the ability to
communicate with the other states. To say that states face multilateral coordination
problems is not, however, to say that these problems have been, or can be, solved
through the evolution of CIL norms. The problem is that the costs of coordination rise
exponentially with the number of states. Imagine ten contiguous states that choose
between different railroad gauges. If there only two different gauges, and each state
chose a gauge independently, the odds that they would all choose the same gauge in
the first round is 1 in 210, or 1 in 1024. In later rounds, one state might, at great cost,
switch to the gauge used by another state, but at the same time other states might
switch to the gauge of the first state. And if there are more than two gauges -- if there
are dozens or hundreds of possibilities -- the odds against coordination are
astronomical. Over a very long period of time, it is conceivable that the states might
eventually settle on the same gauge, especially if some are economically superior.60 But
it is unlikely, and the states would achieve coordination much more rapidly if they sent
representatives to a conference, thrashed out the advantages and disadvantages of the
various gauges, and all agreed on one.
When n-state prisoner’s dilemmas and coordination games are solved, it is usually
by treaty or other international agreement, not by evolution. We discuss this argument
below.61 For now, it is sufficient to understand that our hypothesis is that CIL norms
that have apparent universal scope are in fact the result of coincidence of interest,
coercion, or the pairwise interactions discussed above.

60

The model for such an argument would come from evolutionary game theory. See, for example, H. Peyton
Young, Individual Strategy and Social Structure (1998). This model shows that as long as parties either experiment or
occasionally make errors, and as long as they interact frequently, parties will eventually coordinate on Pareto-optimal
actions. “Eventually,” however, may be a very long time, and the games they use rely on institutional structure that
is lacking with respect to CIL.
61
One can imagine exceptions to this general proposition. Suppose, for example, that two states play a
coordination game that establishes a particular gauge. A third state might independently adopt this standard in
order to minimize the cost of transportation to the first two states. Other states imitate the first three states. Here, the
original bilateral coordination game establishes the focal point to multi-lateral coordination. While this result is
possible, it is difficult to achieve, and we have found no example of it in the case studies examined below.
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6.

A Comparison of the Basic Model and the Traditional View

The traditional perspective would not view a behavioral regularity that arises from
any of the four strategic situations outlined above as an example of CIL. To see why,
begin with coincidence of interest. In this situation, parties acting independently
achieve their best outcomes regardless of the behavior of the other party. The
behavioral regularity of nations not sinking enemy ships in this strategic situation is
functionally identical to the behavioral regularity of nations not sinking their own ships.
There are an infinite number of behavioral regularities of this form that no one would
claim constitutes law or custom. None of these behaviors has anything to do with a
nation’s “sense of legal obligation” that is so central to the traditional account.
Behavioral regularities explained by coercion also would not be viewed as CIL from
the traditional perspective. Coercion is also a situation in which nations act in
accordance with their private interests rather than in accordance with a norm. The
behavioral regularity results from the dominion of the powerful over the weak. While
powerful nations have obvious reasons for wanting to characterize this behavioral
regularity as law, it is nothing more than the outcome of force. Weak states do not act
in the strong state’s interest out of a sense of legal obligation. They do so in order to
avoid retaliation.
Now consider a behavioral regularity that results from pairwise, bilateral prisoner’s
dilemmas. This behavior seems more law-like than in the other two situations. This is
because in any particular iteration of the game, each nation has a private incentive to
cheat. When a nation cooperates in a round, it appears to be complying with a norm
because it acts in a fashion not in its immediate self-interest. This looks law-like. For
these reasons, the bilateral iterated prisoner’s dilemma approaches the traditional
conception of CIL more than the other two strategic forms.
But this explanation for an international behavioral regularity differs from the
traditional account in important respects. A nation’s “compliance” with the cooperative
strategy in the bilateral prisoner’s dilemma has nothing to do with following a norm
from a sense of legal obligation. Nations do not act in accordance with a norm that they
feel obliged to follow; they act because it is in their long-term (or medium-term) interest
to do so. The norm does not cause the nations’ behavior; it reflects their behavior. As a
result, behavior in bilateral iterated prisoner’s dilemmas will change with variations in
the underlying payoffs. Cooperation will rise or fall or break down with changes in
technology and environment. Although most traditional scholars acknowledge that
states are more likely to violate norms of CIL as the payoff from doing so changes, they
appear to insist that the sense of legal obligation will at least put some drag on such
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deviations. We, by contrast, insist that the payoffs from cooperation or deviation are
the sole determinants of whether states engage in the behavioral regularities that are
labeled norms of CIL. This is why we deny the claim that CIL as exogenous influence
on states’ behavior. In addition, the bilateral prisoner’s dilemma cannot generalize to
the situation of multilateral cooperation that is such an important part of the traditional
account.
Finally, pairwise coordination may emerge spontaneously, or “evolve” into a
behavioral regularity, but the resulting norm is not universal. Multilateral coordination
that might look like a universal and law-like regularity is, for reasons explained above,
highly unlikely to evolve. If it were to evolve, states would not act as they do out of a
sense of legal obligation, but rather in order to maximize their payoffs.
B. The Origin and Change of CIL Norms.
Although the basic model of our theory explains how what are called CIL norms can
be sustained, it does not explain how they arise and how they change. But a few
possibilities follow naturally from the theory.
First, when CIL is used to refer to states whose interests coincide, a change in CIL
will occur whenever the states’ interests change, and the states’ interests will change
when the environment changes. For example, states i and j seize each other’s fishing
vessels at time 0, perhaps because they gain more by engaging in mutual predation than
by engaging in unilateral or mutual restraint. At time 1, state k enters the scene and
threatens the security of both state i and state j. Now, states i and j have a better use for
their navies: defense against state k’s navy rather than seizure of fishing vessels. If one
defines a CIL norm as any behavioral regularity, then the CIL norm changes (from
mutal predation at time 0 to mutal restraint at time 1); if one defines a CIL norm only as
behavioral regularities that are “beneficial” in some sense, then the CIL norm arises at
time 1 from the disorder that existed at time 0.
Second, when CIL is used to refer to the behavioral regularity that results when one
state coerces the other, a change in CIL will again occur whenever the states’ interests or
relative power change. State i loses its war with state k and also its power to coerce
state j, and state j starts seizing i’s fishing boats. The old CIL against the seizure of
fishing vessel is either replaced by a new norm or by nothing, or disorder gives way to a
new norm, again depending on how one defines CIL.
Third, when CIL is used to refer to the behavioral regularity that results when two
states confront each other in a bilateral repeated prisoner’s dilemma, a more
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complicated story is needed. One possibility is that CIL norms of this form can arise
when “neutral” behavioral regularities already exist because of coincidence of interest,
but payoffs change, creating a conflict of interest. To illustrate, suppose that at time 0
two states fail to seize each other’s fishing boats just because their navies have more
valuable opportunities. At time 1 these opportunities disappear (e.g., a naval war with
other states ends), and consequently the payoff from seizing fishing boats becomes
higher (in one round) than the payoff from not doing so. Each country must now
decide whether to begin seizing the other’s fishing boats.
At this point, the status quo – not seizing fishing boats – is focal, in the sense that
each state may recognize it as a possible desirable state of affairs and each state may
recognize that the other state may recognize that the first state sees it as a desirable state
of affairs. One state might rationally hold off seizing the other state’s boats in the hope
that the other state recognizes that this is a mutually desirable strategy. Or, one state
might not realize that payoffs have changed, and the other state declines to alert the
first state to that fact by seizing its fishing boats, given that the other state prefers to
preserve the status quo. In either case, one might say that a “mere” behavioral
regularity, one based on coincidence of interest, gives way to a norm, where the
behavioral regularity reflects coopoeration. In contrast, if the status quo is that of
mutual seizure of fishing boats, it will be much more difficult for a pattern of not
seizing boats to arise, given that each state knows that if it stops unilaterally, the other
state will be tempted to continue seizing boats.62 The fact that adherence to the status
quo always presents itself as a focal point, in contrast to the infinite number of other
possible strategy sets, accounts for why CIL norms tend to extend over time once they
get started, and may continue to prevail even after they are no longer desirable
compared to an alternative (on which see our discussion of treaties below).
It is not the case, however, that a “neutral” behavioral regularity is a necessary
predecessor to a CIL norm so understood. Any focal point can stimulate the emergence
of the norm. Suppose that state i and state j face the payoffs described by Table 2 above
-- a conflict of interest situation -- because of an exogenous change. Prior to this change,
each state seized the fishing boats of the other. The change could be, for example, wars
involving other countries, which require the attention of each state’s navies. Each state
still prefers seizing fishing boats to ignoring them in a single round, but both would be
better off over the long term if both refrained from seizing the boats. There is no time
for a treaty. State i might simply announce, “we will no longer seize the fishing boats
from state j, unless state j seizes our fishing boats.” If state j knows state i’s payoffs, it
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might very well believe state i. The joint action of ignoring unless provoked is focal
because of the announcement, which is credible because each state knows that this
strategy leads to the optimal outcome. Thus, a CIL norm can arise despite the absence
of a long historical practice.63
Fourth, when CIL norms arise from behavior in coordination games, they can arise
and change as a result of trial and error. Recall the example of a coordination game in
which armies patrol an area of disputed land that is divided about evenly by a river and
a road. (The river and the road cross at various points.) Suppose the soldiers and
officers want to avoid conflict, and know that conflict will arise if they patrol
overlapping areas. Payoffs can be described as in Table 3, below.
Table 4

river
road

river
3, 3
0, 0

road
0, 0
3, 3

Both sides do best if they patrol up to the same boundary (either river or road), and
come into conflict if they patrol up to a different boundary. If the river is a superior
boundary, say, because it keeps opposing soldiers farther apart, then the payoffs in the
northwest corner would be higher. Then patrolling along the river is a natural focal
point. But even if, as in the table, payoffs for identical actions are equal, one would
expect eventual coordination on the same action, albeit perhaps after an initial period of
conflict.64 And once the pattern is established, no state has an incentive to deviate. We
present this example as a theoretical possibility, however; we do not think it explains
many traditional norms of CIL.
In sum, CIL norms can originate in many ways. If CIL is defined sufficiently
broadly, norms of CIL originate and change whenever states’ interests or power change.
CIL norms can originate by inertia, where the status quo serves as a focal point after
payoffs have changed. They can also originate through unilateral action by a state
when the state’s action and the optimal responses are unambiguous. Finally, they can
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originate when random behavior results in actions that are self-reinforcing. There are
no doubt other ways in which norms of CIL originate. Our purpose here is just to show
that under our understanding of CIL, the way it originates and changes is no mystery.
C. Casuistry and Reputation.
States make promises and commitments and then try not to violate them in an
obvious way. They keep promises, sometimes, and when they do not, rather than
admitting that they violate a promise or remaining silent, they insist on justifying their
actions by reinterpreting the promise. Much promise-making behavior is related to
norms of CIL. For example, after the United States committed itself in its Civil War to a
CIL norm of not seizing enemy goods from neutral ships, it violated this commitment,
but argued that the goods it seized fit into a contraband exception to the norm, an
exception that the United States interpreted so broadly as to leave nothing left of the
rule.65 The question is why the United States engaged in casuistry rather than
admitting the breach of the CIL norm or remaining silent.
A complete answer to this question would take us far afield, but we should sketch
such an answer, because the phenomenon of state casuistry might be taken as an
objection to our thesis that scholars exaggerate the influence of CIL norms on
international behavior. After all, if CIL norms do not affect states’ behavior, why do
states insist that their behavior conforms to the norms of CIL? We will consider two
models.
The rogue state model. As is well known, a person who can commit himself to
keeping promises has more power than a person who cannot.66 The first person can
find partners in valuable joint endeavors; the second person cannot. The same is true
for states. A state can benefit from international cooperation only if other states believe
that it will usually keep its promises. States try to keep their promises in order to
persuade other states that they are reliable.
To see how this works, imagine a game in which state i makes a promise, state j
relies on the promise or declines to rely on it, state i decides whether to breach the
promise, and then the game starts over.67 State i wants state j to rely on the promise,
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but state j will rely on the promise only if state i has a reputation for keeping promises
— that is, state i is a civilized rather than rogue state. At any given round t, state j
might rely on promises made by any state that has kept all (or a major part of) its
promises in the past, and not on promises made by a state that has breached many of its
past promises. Thus, when state i decides whether to breach a promise, it must take
account both of the immediate payoff from breach, and the long-term decline in its
reputation if it breaches. There are a variety of equilibria, including the typical
“babbling” equilibrium in which no one believes or bothers to make promises,68 but a
plausible equilibrium is one in which state i keeps promises even against immediate
interest, and state j believes that state i is civilized. This result does not mean that states
always keep promises. The result means that states will keep promises as long as the
reputational gains exceed any short-term benefit from breach.
Whether an action is a breach of a promise is not always clear. When ambiguity
exists, a state will always claim that it kept a promise rather than admitting a breach. A
state’s insistence that an action is consistent with a promise is a statement that the state
keeps its promises. A state would generally not keep silent or admit that it were
breaking a promise, because then it would reveal that it did not keep promises. By
insisting that it did keep a promise, a state leaves open the possibility that other states
will believe that it did, and thus not revise their beliefs about whether the state is
civilized or rogue. The existence of casuistry, then, does not presuppose a harmonious
world in which states keep all or even many of their promises. It presupposes only that
some states are more likely to keep their promises then other states, and all states would
rather be classified in the first group.
The coordination model. Another reason that states keep their promises and try to act
consistently is that they receive payoffs when other states successfully rely on their
actions. Recall the two-state repeat prisoner’s dilemma model of the fishing vessel
exemption. Each state refrains from seizing the fishing vessels of the other state, in the
expectation that the other state will do the same. As we noted above, this game
involves a problem of coordination: what counts as a “seizure” of a fishing vessel. The
conventional wisdom is that an illegal seizure occurs when the seized ship is small,
plies coastal waters, and carries live fish; it is not illegal to seize a large commercial ship
that engages in deep-water fishing, and carries salted fish.
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Rev. 45 (1992).
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Recall our example, in which state i’s navy seizes a large vessel that plies coastal
waters. Perhaps, this form of fishing is new, made possible by technological
innovations. To avoid retaliation against its small fishing vessels, state i might say that
it has complied with customary internation law, arguing that seizure of the large boat
does not count as a “defection” in the repeat prisoner’s dilemma.
On this
interpretation, the reference to a “norm of CIL” is an economical way of saying that one
has not cheated. The statement is not irrational; it may indeed have communicative
value. If state j wants to maintain the cooperative outcome in the prisoner’s dilemma, it
may rationally refrain from punishing i, either because it agrees that in the optimal
outcome both states can seize large coastal ships, or because it believes that i simply
made a mistake. In the latter case, states i and j might argue about what should count
as cooperation or cheating, and eventually settle on a compromise.
Both of these models are incomplete. But they capture important elements of reality,
and show why the existence of casuistry and argument about CIL does not mean that
CIL has independent normative force. Even if CIL norms are the outcomes of prisoner’s
dilemmas and coordination games, it makes sense for states to claim to comply with
CIL, not to admit violating CIL, and to argue about what CIL means. A CIL norm
represents states’ expectations, which are based on past behavior; arguments about CIL
norms are arguments about whether expectations have been met or violated.
More generally, it is hard to see why reputation would play an important role in
explaining the evolution of CIL norms. The officials who direct a state’s foreign policy
must worry about that state’s reputation among foreign states, but they also respond to
domestic pressures to violate international law that injures domestic interests.69
Moreover, as Keohane has observed, a reputation for compliance with international law
is not necessarily the best means, and certainly not the only means, for accomplishing
foreign policy objectives.70 States can also benefit from reputations for toughness or
even for irrationality or unpredictability. Powerful states, like the United States, cannot
be punished when they violate international law, so they may do better by violating
international law when doing so shows that they will retaliate against threats to
national security (for example, Clinton’s arguably illegal bombing of Sudan). Weak
states with idiosyncratic domestic arrangements, like Iraq, Serbia, or North Korea, may
benefit by being unpredictable or irrational. As Schelling has famously shown, one
cannot successfully threaten a person if that person is irrational.71 One might conclude
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that all things equal, nations will strive to have a reputation for compliance with
international law, but that reputation for compliance will not often be of paramount
concern, because all things aren’t equal.
D. Customs Among Nations and Individuals
Many people believe customs among individuals -- for example, among merchants - are quite robust.72 This belief raises the question why, contrary to what our theory
maintains, customs among nations should not also be robust. To answer this question,
first one must realize that we do not think that behavioral regularities associated with
CIL are not robust. The CIL norms of ambassadorial immunity, for example, are quite
powerful, although they do note operate as the standard account presumes.73 Our
claim is that the games we describe account for the emergence and maintenance of
customs, whether they are powerful or weak. We think that similar games can also
account for the emergence and operation of customs in ordinary life.74
That said, we do not think it useful to draw analogies from the individual to the
international context. There are too many differences between individual behavior and
international behavior. To name a few: individuals feel emotions, internalize norms
and are swayed by guilt and shame. No one knows for sure how these factors
contribute to the development of social norms, but clearly the process is highly
complex.75 By contrast, states do not have psychologies. If states internalize norms in
some sense, as some authors claim, the process is historical and political, not
psychological, so analogies to the education of individuals are not useful. In addition,
individual action takes place in an environment of dense and overlapping institutions,
including families, governments, churches, and workplaces, all of which sanction those
who deviate from norms, habituate people to behavior consistent with norms, and have
roots that plunge deep into history and (in the case of the family) biology. By contrast,
international institutions are extremely weak, have emerged only recently after the most
laborious efforts, do not as a general matter provide the means for disciplining states,
and still are not suited for disciplining states that violate CIL.
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States are not people, and so one should not expect states to act like people. The
state itself, unlike any single leader, reflects a variety of constituencies, has an
indefinitely long life, and is built out of expectations that have deep cultural and
historical roots. The international arena is much more violent and unstable than
ordinary life. And customs among nations are less common and more fragile than
customs among individuals.
E. Summary.
Behavior regularities do arise at an international level. We identify four main
strategic situations in which behavioral regularities are likely to emerge: coincidence of
interest, coercion, bilateral repeat prisoner’s dilemma, and bilateral coordination. Each
pattern results from nations following their self-interest. Behavioral regularities that
reflect these patterns might not be considered remarkable or desirable. But we claim
that they – rather than the notion of practices followed from a sense of legal obligation –
account for the norms of CIL identified by courts and scholars.76 The demonstration of
this claim is the burden of Part III.

III.

Case Studies

In this section, we test the theory developed in Section II against the evidence said to
constitute CIL in four areas: neutrality, diplomatic immunity, prize, and maritime
jurisdiction. These CIL rules are thought to be robust ones under the traditional
account.77 We argue that the theory explains the evidence more persuasively than the
traditional account of CIL.
A. Free Ships, Free Goods
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The CIL of neutrality purports to govern relations between neutrals and belligerents
during times of war. One important neutrality issue is the status of enemy property on
neutral ships. Two general principles have competed throughout history to resolve this
issue. One principle held that a belligerent could seize enemy goods on a neutral
(“friends’”) ship. The other principle, captured in the phrase “free ships, free goods”
(FSFG), held that all property on a neutral’s ship, including enemy property, was
immune from seizure. From the seventeenth to the middle of the nineteenth centuries,
treaties and state practice reflected both principles, with many variations.78
Conventional wisdom among courts and treatise writers views FSFG to have been a
well-established rule of CIL after the Declaration of Paris in 1856.79 The Declaration
followed the Crimean War (1852-56), in which France, England, Turkey and Piedmont
defeated Russia. One of the Declaration’s four principles was the FSFG principle: “The
neutral flag covers enemy’s goods, with the exception of contraband.”80 All parties to the
Crimean War signed the declaration, and during the next fifty years most of the major
nations of the world acceded to the it. In addition, the nations that did not accede to the
Declaration consistently announced adherence to the FSFG principle at the outset of
wars in which they were belligerents. The broad accession to the Declaration, consistent
state pronouncements in support of FSFG, and the relative paucity of overt violations of
FSFG, are the primary bases for the claim that the FSFG principle was a rule of CIL after
1856.
Our theory of CIL predicts that a universal behavioral regularity tracking FSFG
would not likely develop in the face of the conflict of interest it implicates between
neutrals and belligerents. In this Section we argue that the historical evidence supports
our thesis rather than the conventional wisdom. There was no CIL rule of FSFG in the
sense of a universal behavioral regularity of belligerents not seizing enemy property on
neutral ships. Academic and judicial claims to the contrary exemplify several errors
common to analyses of CIL.
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1.

Revisionist Account

Controversies about belligerent and neutral rights played relatively little role in
international relations during the period 1856-1914.81 In part this was because England,
the traditional beacon of belligerent rights, did not participate in continental wars
during this period.82 More broadly, the wars fought during the period did not last
long, took place mostly on land, and did not require the disruption of sea trade in a way
that affected neutral maritime rights.83 In short, this was not a period that provided
many tests for the FSFG principle. It is against this background that we examine
whether FSFG was a rule of CIL during the period.
United States Civil War. For its first seventy years, the United States was the world’s
most ardent defender of neutral rights. This stance was designed to promote U.S. trade
and keep the United States out of European entanglements. It included a firm
commitment to FSFG, a strict conception of blockade, and a narrow conception of
contraband.84 The United States did not sign the pro-neutral Declaration of Paris
because, as a relatively weak naval power, it objected to the Declaration’s provision
outlawing privateering.85 But in light of its historic support for FSFG, it was no
surprise that, when its Civil War began five years after the Declaration, the United
States announced adherence to “free ships, free goods, contraband excepted.”86
The United States’ novel status as a dominant naval belligerent provided the first
real test of its commitment to neutrality principles. It failed the test. In the “single
incident in which the question of free ships, free goods arose during the Civil war,” a
United States Prize court apparently rejected the FSFG principle.87 Much more
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insidious to the FSFG principle than this overt violation was the United States’
widespread disruption of neutral ships carrying enemy goods under the guise of an
unprecedentedly broad conception of blockade and contraband. The expansion of these
collateral doctrines illustrates the emptiness of the FSFG principle and, more broadly,
the CIL of neutrality.
At the outset of the Civil War, Lincoln declared a blockade of the entire coastline of
the Confederate states. A blockade justified a belligerent in seizing all ships -- including
neutral ships -- attempting to violate the blockade. The traditional United States
position was that blockades were binding only if they were “effective” in the sense of
preventing access to the enemy’s coast.88 Anything short of this strict definition of
effective blockade would allow a belligerent to declare a paper blockade and “assert a
general right to capture any ship bound to his enemy,” thereby undermining FSFG and
other neutral rights.89 American insistence on the principle of effective blockades was
one reason for the War of 1812.90
When Lincoln declared the blockade of the Confederacy, one union ship covered
each 66 miles of confederate coast, and nine out of ten vessels successfully breached the
blockade; during the war five of six blockade runners made it through.91 This porous
blockade clearly would have been deemed ineffective under prior U.S. policy.92 But
Lincoln and his advisors changed the United States’ prior stance, arguing that a
blockade did not have to be totally effective to be legally effective.93 The Supreme
Court, sitting as a Prize court, later ratified Lincoln’s view as consistent with CIL.94
England accepted the blockade as legal, because it supported its long-term goal to
expand the power of the blockade, and because the blockade was easy to circumvent in
any event.95
The United States’ practice with respect to effective blockade undermined the force
of the FSFG principle, because it justified the United States in preying on neutral vessels
anywhere at sea that were bound to a blockaded port. By itself, this practice did not
88
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completely undermine FSFG, for a neutral could in theory take enemy property to a
neutral port for subsequent shipment to the Confederacy. But the United States closed
this loophole too. In the early nineteenth century, it had vigorously protested the
English practice of seizing American ships sailing between two neutral ports on the
ground that the goods were on a “continuous voyage” to a blockaded port.96 In the
Civil War, it reversed course and began to capture neutral vessels sailing between
neutral ports if the ultimate destination of the goods on board the ship were to the
In so doing, the United States engaged in liberal
blockaded confederacy.97
presumptions about the goods’ ultimate destination that expanded the concept of
“continuous voyage” beyond even England’s broad interpretation. The Supreme Court,
sitting as a Prize court applying CIL, upheld this broad conception too.98
The United States’ liberal policy concerning blockade and continuous voyage
rendered the FSFG principle otiose in practice.99 This policy was guided by
expediency, not principle. The goal was to be as aggressive as possible in shutting
down trade with the confederacy without provoking the British to enter the War on the
side of the South. In pursuing this goal, some United States officials (such as Secretary
of State William Henry Seward) were indifferent to CIL or tried to manipulate its
ostensible requirements for strategic purposes; other officials (such as Secretary of Navy
Gideon Welles ) were ignorant or disdainful of CIL.100 There is no evidence that the
FSFG rule to which the United States announced adherence at the outset of the war had
any influence on the government’s decision-making process, and it was belied by its
practice.
Following the American Civil War other nations also expanded collateral maritime
doctrines to water down the FSFG principle in practice.101 For example, in the Franco96
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Chinese conflict of 1885, the French embraced a broad doctrine of continuous voyage
and contraband to seize a ship carrying rice between neutral ports.102 Japan engaged in
a similar acts during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, as did the Italians in their 1896 war
with Abyssinia.103
Spanish-American War. In the next major war, the Spanish-American War (1898), the
United States and Spain engaged each other primarily through naval power. Although
neither nation was at the time a signatory to the Declaration of Paris, both nations
announced adherence to its principles — including FSFG — at the outset of the war.104
During the war Spain did not disrupt neutral ships that contained United States
property. And despite controversial blockades of a few Spanish ports and a mildly
expansive contraband list,105 the United States enforced its belligerent rights in a very
narrow fashion.106
One could interpret these events as support for the FSFG principle. But closer
inspection reveals that neither country had an interest in disrupting neutral commerce
during the war. The war lasted barely three months. During this time, Spain lacked the
naval capacity to prey on neutral ships. Its naval force in the Philippines was destroyed
less than two weeks after the war began and in any event never presented a threat to
neutral commerce.107 The Spanish Navy in the Atlantic might have presented a greater
threat to neutral commerce because of its proximity to the United States. But it
consisted of only “four armored cruisers and a few torpedo boats and destroyers” that
were “inadequately equipped, out of repair, and wretchedly manned.”108 And in any
event the Spanish naval forces were blockaded in Santiago Harbor in Cuba before they
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were destroyed.109 Spain declined to prey on neutral commerce in the war not because
of international law, but rather because it lacked the naval capacity to do so.
The United States had different reasons for not preying on neutral commerce during
the three month war. There were few Spanish goods on neutral ships for it to
capture,110 and the United States’ overwhelming military and strategic superiority
precluded any strategic need to prey on neutral ships. Because the United States had no
military interest in disrupting neutral commerce, it could -- unlike during the Civil War
-- take a position in line with its long-term commercial interests. As a traditional
neutral that was heavily dependent on maritime commerce, the United States had (with
the notable exception of the Civil War) long advocated complete immunity of private
property at sea.111 President McKinley’s 1898 Annual Message to Congress included a
proposal for an international agreement to achieve this end, and the United States
strongly urged the Hague Conference of 1899 to consider this proposal.112 Pursuit of
this long-term goal required the United States to refrain, if possible, from an aggressive
assertion of belligerent rights in the war with Spain -- a posture that events proved the
United States could afford to maintain.
Boer War. The Anglo-Boer War (1899-1904) between Britain and the two Boer
republics (Transvaal and the Orange Free State) did not at first portend a dispute over
maritime rights. The Boer republics had no navy, no merchant ships, and no coast to
attack or blockade. And the British were disinclined to attack neutral trade because
they believed that the Boers did not depend on it and because they wanted to avoid
reprisals from neutrals. For these reasons among others, the British announced at the
War’s outset that they would not search or detain any neutral ship.113
The British attitude toward neutrals changed following early military setbacks and
reports that the Boers were receiving supplies through Lourenco Marques, the neutral
port for Portugese Mozambique that was forty miles by rail to the Transvaal frontier.
For several months in 1899-1900, the British Navy seized American and German ships
sailing from neutral ports to Lourenco Marques. In so doing, the British government
acted on the basis of military expediency, and ignored legal advice that such seizures
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would violate CIL and the manual of the English Admiralty.114 The British government
justified the seizures on the grounds that the ships carried contraband goods and that
there was a “reasonable ground” that the ultimate destination of the goods was to the
Boer republics.115 The British conception of contraband goods was unprecedentedly
broad, including foodstuffs.116 So too was its use of the continuous voyage doctrine.117
The British expansion of the contraband and continuous voyage doctrines vitiated
the FSFG principle just as the United States had done during the Civil War. In contrast
to the British response to the United States practice during the Civil War, however, the
British practice during the Boer War caused the United States and Germany to threaten
retaliation.118 In response, Britain defended the legality of its actions, but it finally
stopped preying on neutral commerce and it compensated some of the affected German
commercial interests.119
The resolution of the maritime rights disputes in the Boer war resulted in a
behavioral regularity consistent with the FSFG principle. But Britain did not obey the
FSFG principle out of a “sense of legal obligation.” Britain began the war with no
interest in preying on neutral shipping. When its strategic needs changed it reversed
this policy even though doing so violated the ostensible requirements of CIL. It then
retreated in the face of neutral threats which negated any gains from interrupting
neutral trade.
Russo-Japanese War. During the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), Russia took an
even more aggressive stance towards enemy property on neutral ships than the United
States during its Civil War and Britain during the Boer War. Both Russia and Japan
proclaimed adherence to the FSFG principle at the outset of the war. But Russia also
claimed the right to seize and sink neutral ships carrying contraband, and its
contraband list was unprecedentedly broad, including food, fuel, and other general use
items.120 Pursuant to these rules, the Russian navy harassed, seized, and sometimes
sank American, German, and British ships, many of which contained only foodstuffs
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and were not bound for a Japanese port.121 In practice enemy property on neutral ships
received no protection.122
Russian policy and actions provoked threats of retaliation from Britain and
especially the United States.123 The Russian foreign ministry came to believe that
“Russia stood to lose far more by provoking Britain and the United States than it could
possibly gain by seizing a few cargoes of food.”124 Accordingly, as Britain had done
during the Boer War, Russia maintained the legality of its policies but backed away
from its aggressive anti-neutral actions. Once again, the Russian action is best
understood as bowing to threats of retaliation in the pursuit of short term interests
rather than compliance out of a sense of legal obligation to a rule of CIL.
World War I. The absence of a customary practice concerning the rights of maritime
neutrals that was so evident in the U.S Civil War, the Boer War, and the Russo-Japanese
War was confirmed by the events of the Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907 and
the London Conference of 1909-1910. The Hague Conference was unable to reach
agreement about the content of maritime doctrines -- contraband, blockade, continuous
voyage, and the like -- that belligerents had invoked to skirt the FSFG rule.125 The
Conference also split on the American proposal to immunize all private property from
capture during war. When delegates from the maritime powers met at the London
Conference in 1908-09, they were able to reach agreement on a substantive law of
maritime rights, including concrete definitions concerning contraband, continuous
voyage, and blockade. But many governments (most notably England) rejected the
agreement, and no country ever ratified it.
World War I began a few years later. It is well known that the war destroyed any
pretense of a law of maritime rights. Contraband lists expanded to include any item
unless there was proof that it was not destined for an enemy.126 Blockades were
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clearly ineffective and were extended to neutral ports.127 Blacklists, embargoes, and
mining further disrupted neutral commerce.128 In short, all property on neutral ships,
and especially enemy property, was subject to seizure.129 Scholars like to say that the
belligerents violated the norms of CIL; it is more accurate to say that behavioral
regularities that emerged during prior wars disappeared in World War I, no doubt
because of changes in technology, stakes, and interests.
2.

Significance

The FSFG principle illustrates how our theory explains the behaviors associated
with CIL better than the traditional conception. It better explains the patterns of
behavior consistent with the ostensible CIL norm; it better explains deviations from the
norm and related puzzles; and it reveals a variety of errors of generalization typical of
CIL analysis.
In some of the wars during the period belligerents and neutrals achieved a
behavioral equilibrium that was consistent with the FSFG rule. The best explanation for
these equilibria is not, however, adherence to an exogenous CIL norm from a sense of
legal obligation. In every war, a belligerent’s decision whether, and to what extent, to
forego capturing enemy property on neutral ships was the product of a careful
assessment of its (usually short-term) interests. Belligerents sometimes gained little
from interrupting neutral trade and thus did not try. This “coincidence of interest”
situation was the position of England at the outset of the Boer War and the United
States throughout the Spanish-American War. Other times belligerents gained much
from capturing enemy goods on neutral ships but lost more from neutral retaliation.
This “coercion” situation was the position of England later in the Boer War and Russia
late in its war with Japan. In those cases in which the belligerent’s desire to disrupt
enemy property on neutral ships was not checked by a superior threat of neutral
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retaliation, the ostensible FSFG rule did nothing to prevent them from doing so. This
too can be seen as a coincidence of interest.
The FSFG example also illustrates many changes in the actual practice of nations
that are consistent with the view that international behavior is a function of nations’
changing interests and relative power, but that make no sense under the view that
nations abide by CIL from a sense of obligation. For example, state practice and the
rationalization of practice with regard to the status of enemy property on neutral ships
changed in important ways from war to war. In addition, nations changed their views
about the content of CIL in accordance with changing interests in particular contexts.
Thus, for example, the United States asserted neutral rights liberally throughout the
nineteenth except for the one time that it was a belligerent (its Civil War), when it
asserted unprecedentedly broad belligerent rights. Similarly, England asserted broad
belligerent rights in the Boer War but protested when Russia asserted similar rights in
the Russo-Japanese War just a few years later. Germany vehemently protested the
British anti-neutral practices during the Boer War but engaged in much more aggressive
anti-neutral acts a little more than ten years later.
In addition, the FSFG example illustrates several common fallacies of generalization
among international law theorists. Scholars base the claim that FSFG was a rule of CIL
during the period following the Crimean War on three types of evidence: widespread
accession to the Declaration of Paris, verbal commitments to FSFG at the outset of wars
and in other diplomatic contexts, and the relative paucity of overt violations of the rule.
For several reasons, this evidence does not demonstrate an international behavioral
regularity followed from a sense of obligation.
The first error is to infer a law-like behavioral regularity from verbal commitments
to a rule of CIL. We have seen that there was not in fact a behavioral regularity of not
seizing enemy property on neutral ships during the period in question. Throughout the
period belligerents invoked and expanded a variety of related maritime rights in a way
that enabled them to continue preying on enemy property on neutral ships in much the
same fashion (and probably more aggressively) than the pre-1856 period. As one
commentator observed:
[W]hile granting that the letter of the law [of “free ships, free goods”] has
been strictly observed, the conclusion that is forced upon the student of recent
practice is that, through unwarranted extension of belligerent rights based upon
related portions of the law of maritime warfare, the rule that private enemy
property is free when transported in neutral ships very nearly approaches
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nullity, and is only preserved in some semblance of vigor by the influence of
neutral opposition to the devices of belligerents rendering it a dead letter.130
By focusing on pronouncements and the relative paucity of “direct” violations of the
FSFG principle, commentators have overlooked the many ways in which the practice of
seizing enemy goods on neutral ships continued unabated.
A second error, an error of induction, is to view coincidence of interest situations as
an example of norm-following. For example, in the Spanish-American War neither
belligerent had an enforceable interest in seizing enemy property on neutral ships. The
nations were not abiding by a CIL norm; they simply lacked either the means or the
interest in seizing the enemy property. A third error is the belief that the behavioral
regularities associated with an ostensible CIL rule possess a unitary underlying logic.
The FSFG example shows that such behavioral regularities might have multiple, and
quite different, explanations. Nations sometimes refrained from seizing enemy
property on neutral ships because that lacked any affirmative interest in doing so, and
other times because of fear of neutral retaliation.
A fourth error is the belief that what might be called “cooperation” in certain
maritime contexts generalizes to all maritime contexts. As the Boer War and RussoJapanese Wars demonstrate, if a powerful neutral makes a credible threat of retaliation,
the belligerent might refrain from seizing neutral ships. But such belligerent acts are a
function of war-specific allocations of power and other contingent factors that inform
belligerent and neutral payoff structures. These acts are the product of these contingent
factors rather than compliance with an independent legal norm. There is no in theory
reason to believe that payoff structures that result in this behavioral regularity in some
wars will be present in all, or even most, wars. The FSFG example bears out this point
in practice.
There is a final aspect of the FSFG story worth noting. Although state practice
during the period cannot support the claim that FSFG was a rule of CIL, it is
nonetheless striking that every belligerent during the post-1856 period announced
adherence to FSFG as a principle of international law, and every nation attempted to
justify departures from this principle as consistent with international law. We sketched
above how claims of adherence to international law can function as attempts either to
signal that a nation is not a rogue state or to alert partners in a coordination game that
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expectations have changed.131 Belligerents want neutrals to believe that they can be
trusted, so they will not admit that they break their commitments to abide by
international norms. When circumstances change and states no longer believe that they
profitably abide by their earlier commitments, they announce a reinterpretation of the
these commitments rather than admit that they have violated them, in order to avoid
the inference that they will not honor other commitments they have made along other
dimensions of interaction.
B. Ambassadorial Immunity
Commentators have long agreed that CIL requires states to protect foreign
ambassadors and related personnel.132 This requirement divides into two main
components. First, the host state may not harm foreign diplomatic personnel, either
through civil or criminal process, or through extra-legal means. Second, the host state
must protect foreign diplomatic personnel from threats posed by citizens of the host
state. Although these requirements have limitations, and they have fluctuated to some
extent over the years, the CIL of ambassadorial immunity -- now codified in the Vienna
Convention133 -- has always been considered one of the most robust norms of CIL. It is
therefore a suitable test case for our theory of CIL.
Our theory holds that a nation would grant ambassadorial immunity only when in
its private interest to do so, or in bilateral, repeat games in which payoffs from
cooperation relative to defection are relatively high, discount rates are relatively low,
and conduct is sufficiently observable. In this Section we first explain why behavioral
regularities concerning ambassadorial immunity are consistent with the theory. We
then offer explanations for various deviations from the behavioral regularity of
protecting ambassadors that are inexplicable (except, is some cases, as “violations”)
under the traditional account.
1.
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A nation can either protect or not protect diplomats. Ambassadorial immunity is a
behavioral regularity of nations protecting diplomats. The regularity is remarkable
because there are an enormous number of diplomatic encounters, and the instances of
abuse are rare. Diplomatic immunity from criminal jurisdiction appears to be a
particularly robust norm, for diplomats do commit crimes with some regularity, and
immunity from criminal jurisdiction is almost always granted.134
There are several explanations for this behavioral regularity. One is coincidence of
interest. A host state will not harm a diplomat if the immediate payoff from protecting
him is less than the payoff from not protecting him. Whenever a host state harasses,
arrests, or expels a diplomat for any reason, it suffers an immediate cost, namely, the
breakdown in the channels of communication with the sending state. For this reason
alone, if a diplomat has not outraged the local population or engaged in espionage or
other activities that threaten national security, the immediate payoff from harassing,
arresting, or expelling will likely be less than the payoff that results from maintaining
the channels of communication. A behavioral regularity that exemplifies this logic
would be a mere coincidence of interest.
This theory does not fully explain states’ treatment of diplomatic personnel. It often
happens that the payoff from not protecting diplomats is very high. Iranians mobbed
the United States embassy in 1979 in part because they believed that the United States
was responsible for the Shah’s regime. If the Iranian government had restrained the
mob, it would have suffered a decline in its popularity among citizens. The local
population can be similarly aroused when diplomatic personnel violate local criminal
laws. Members of the British public were upset when an American ambassador was
not prosecuted after shooting to death an intruder.135 The American Congress has
several times considered bills designed to restrict immunity for certain crimes like
drunk driving.136 More recently, the American public was aroused when a Georgian
diplomat ran over and killed an American teenager in New York while driving under
the influence of alcohol.137 There are many similar examples. In all of these cases,
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governments responsive to popular agitation would receive a relatively high short-term
payoff by either seizing or allowing others to seize diplomatic personnel.
This possibility suggests that the CIL of diplomatic immunity might better be
modeled as an iterated prisoner’s dilemma. Suppose that state i has the following
payoffs (see Table 3). It receives 10 if its ambassador can operate unharassed in state j
while it harasses state j’s ambassador in state i; 6 if its ambassador operates unharassed
while state j’s ambassador also enjoys security in state i; 2 if both ambassadors are
harassed or withdrawn; and 0 if state i’s ambassador is harassed while state j’s
ambassador is not harassed. Suppose further that state j has symmetrical payoffs.
These payoffs might occur during times of tension. Each state benefits if its ambassador
enjoys security because that ambassador can send and receive diplomatic messages and
engage in espionage. Each state benefits if it can successfully harass or harm the other
state’s ambassador, thereby preventing that ambassador from engaging in espionage
without interfering with communication. But if both states harass the ambassador of
the other, then communication breaks down, and the suboptimal equilibrium results.
Table 5

harass
protect

harass
2, 2
0, 10

protect
10, 0
6, 6

In these circumstances, diplomatic immunity is a prisoner’s dilemma, and can be
solved only if the two states expect to have repeat dealings with each other and the
other conditions of two-state cooperation are met. They conditions are usually met.
Relations between two states are almost always indefinitely long games. The benefits
from diplomatic communication are high, but these benefits are always spread out over
the long term. Short-term deviations may be tempting because of local or temporary
political circumstances, but are unlikely to exceed the (undiscounted) long-term benefit
of communication. When a diplomat from state j commits a crime, for example, state i
has an interest in enforcing its criminal laws against the diplomat to preserve the
integrity of the criminal law and prevent local unrest. But if i prosecutes the diplomat,
it suffers more than just a breakdown in communication with j, for j has a hostage in the
person of i’s ambassador and may retaliate by harming i’s ambassador.138 These
adverse consequences from enforcing local criminal law against j’s diplomat mean that i
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will receive a larger payoff from non-enforcement, if j refrains in similar circumstances.
A diplomat may impose costs on a host state whether he commits a crime or not; the
host state refrains from punishing him because it wants to maintain its own diplomat in
the foreign state. The cooperative strategy (immunity) has a clear all-or-nothing quality
that is relatively easy to monitor; indeed, the all-or-nothing quality of state’s responses
are probably intended to avoid ambiguity. Each nation’s response to a violation of the
immunity rule (retaliate) is clear and easy to enforce.139 And nations that successfully
maintain long-term diplomatic relations are always relatively civilized and stable states,
rather than rogue or revolutionary states, consistent with the assumption that
cooperation can be achieved only when parties have low discount rates.
At first glance the existence of the relatively robust ambassadorial immunity rule
appears to be a counterexample to our claim that robust multinational behavioral
regularities are not likely to exist.140 In fact, it shows the opposite. It illustrates our
claim that a universal behavioral regularity may develop as an amalgam of
independent, bilateral repeat prisoner’s dilemmas. The logic of ambassadorial
immunity -- sending and receiving diplomats, the monitoring of diplomatic activities,
the breakdown in communication and the retaliation that follow harm to a diplomat,
and so forth -- takes place within, and is fully explained by, bilateral relations. The fact
that states X and Y have diplomatic relations with n other states is irrelevant; relations
with third countries do no work in explaining the diplomatic immunity rule. Far from
being a multilateral norm, and far from being a manifestation of states’ sense of legal
obligation (whatever that means), ambassadorial immunity can reflect equilibria that
arise independently from strategic behavior in pair-wise interactions among all states.
Abundant evidence supports this claim. When diplomatic immunity is denied or
postponed, the diplomat’s country often retaliates, but third countries do not. To take
one of scores of similar examples, in 1961 the Soviet Union expelled the Dutch
ambassador in protest of the Dutch police’s alleged mishandling of the Soviet
ambassador, but no other nations retaliated.141 Only in egregious cases do otherwise139
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uninvolved states retaliate against another state for violating the norms of diplomatic
immunity, and even in these cases retaliation is neither universal nor robust. Consider
the unprecedented Iranian invasion of the American embassy. No country pulled its
embassy from Iran. Only the United States’ closest allies -- the European Community
nations and Japan -- imposed economic sanctions. They did so late, grudgingly, and in
response to enormous pressure from the United States.142 The sanctions they finally
did impose were generally acknowledged to be ineffectual, empty gestures.143

2.

Explaining Puzzles and Deviations

We have explained how our theory accounts for a general behavioral regularity of
states protecting diplomats. But contrary to the traditional account, our theory does not
predict equilibrium behavior to be identical among all states. It is one thing to say, at a
high level of generality, that nations respect diplomatic immunity and that equilibria
resemble each other. This is not surprising because the same basic strategic game is
being played by states in the same basic position. States exchange ambassadors for the
communicative benefits, they are sometimes tempted to prosecute foreign ambassadors
or to fail to protect them from harm, they risk a breakdown in communications and
retaliation against their ambassador, and they hold foreign ambassadors as hostages.
But our theory predicts that details of behavior will vary in important respects when the
relationships among states vary. The evidence is too sketchy to confirm or falsify these
hypotheses with rigor. But it is highly suggestive.144
The first claim is that rogue states violate the norms of diplomatic immunity more
often than civilized states do. When states have unstable political institutions, their
leaders must weigh short-term payoffs more heavily than leaders in other states do. As
a result, they are more willing to risk retaliation in order to obtain any payoffs from
violating diplomatic immunity in the present. Available empirical evidence shows that
developing countries, countries in the throes of revolution, and countries controlled by
unstable dictators violate diplomatic immunity more frequently than civilized states
do.145 The Iran hostage crisis is a prominent example, but so too are the 1967 attack on
the British embassy by supporters of the Cultural Revolution in China, and the 1958
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Iraqi military coup that resulted in the burning of the British embassy.146 Relatedly, a
survey of U.S. Foreign Service Officers indicated that “the extent of protection in socalled ‘civilized countries’ was greater than in newly emerging nations,” and that the in
these emerging nations, “the degree of protection apparently sometimes coincided with
the level of political stability and the role of the political leader.”147 There are many
similar examples.148
The second claim is that states are more likely to violate diplomatic immunity when
stakes change, so that the benefit from violating immunity (for example, quelling a
popular outcry) are very high or the benefit from respecting immunity (maintaining
communication with a state) are low. Several observations are consistent with this
claim. Perhaps the most frequent denial of diplomatic immunity occurs when the
diplomat does something in the host state that threatens its national security.149 To take
two examples: The British seized Swedish Ambassador Count Gyllenborg in 1917 in
connection with a plot to overthrow George I;150 and in 1914, the United States arrested
and seized the papers of an attache of the German embassy who was conspiring against
the neutrality of the United States.151 When a nation’s security is threatened, it receives
a heightened payoff from compromising diplomatic immunity. Another example is the
well-documented mistreatment of diplomats behind the iron curtain at the onset of the
Cold War.152 The former communist states were closed societies that often arrested,
detained, and harassed diplomats -- in violation of accepted immunity principles -- in
order to deter their travel, inquiries, and photography within the host state.153 Wilson
refers to this trend as a “retrogression” from traditional practice.154 The retrogression
makes sense: the communist states suffered more domestically than non-communist
states from enforcement of the traditional CIL of diplomatic immunity, and thus
enforced it less.
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The third claim is that the robustness of the norm of diplomatic immunity will vary
among pairs of countries, and over time, in response to differences in underlying
payoffs. Respect for diplomatic immunities, far from being universal, is sensitive to
variations in bilateral relations among states over time. The Soviet Union mistreated
foreign diplomats with greater regularity than Russia did before and after the Soviet
Union; the United States and the Soviet Union subjected each other’s diplomats to more
harassment during the Cold War than at other times; and states in the East Block treated
diplomats from the West with less respect than states within the East block.155 The
explanation for these variations is that the diplomats of one’s enemies pose a greater
threat to security than the diplomats of one’s friends, so more often the payoff from
violating diplomatic immunity will be higher than the cost.
C. Fishing Vessel Exemption in Prize
The CIL of prize governs the circumstances in which belligerents are entitled to
make captures at sea during times of war. One widely known exception to a
belligerent’s right of capture concerns coastal fishing vessels owned by civilians of the
enemy.156 This exemption is famous because it was recognized in the influential case,
The Paquete Habana.157 For that reason we make it the subject of this section. We argue
that there is no evidence that states have refrained from seizing fishing vessels in order
to conform to a norm of CIL. We conjecture that for the most part states have not seized
fishing vessels just when their navies had more valuable opportunities. The Paquete
Habana itself is best understood as a one-time judgment by the Supreme Court about the
immediate national interest, which both misdescribed contemporary CIL and had no
influence on the subsequent CIL of prize. Where the Supreme Court and treatise
writers describe a robust rule of international law, we find a handful of practices
scattered over hundreds of years and involving highly disparate and context-specific
relations. There may have been a few instances of cooperation in bilateral repeat
prisoner’s dilemmas, but the fishing vessel exemption was for the most part a label
attached to a practice in which states engaged independently of the actions of other
states.
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1.

Revisionist Account

Although the court in The Paquete Habana held that the fishing vessel exemption did
not become a norm of CIL until the nineteenth century,158 the Court examined the
prehistory of the CIL norm, and such an examination is instructive.159 Prior to the
nineteenth century, pairs of states would occasionally agree not to attack each other’s
civilian fishing vessels. These agreements included a treaty signed by the Kings of
France and England in 1403; treaties, joint edicts, and mutual understandings followed
between France and the Holy Roman Empire in 1521; and treaties and understandings
between France and Holland in 1536 and again in 1675. France appears to have had a
long-standing practice of allowing admirals to conclude fishing truces with enemies
“provided that the enemy will likewise accord them to Frenchmen.” In 1779 France
announced that it would not seize vessels carrying fresh fish, and in 1780 the seizure of
an English fishing vessel was declared illegal.160 At roughly the same time, England
stopped seizing French fishing boats. Yet shortly thereafter England authorized the
seizure of French fishing vessels, and in 1793 the French National Convention asked the
executive to conduct reprisals. England again authorized the seizure of French, and
also Dutch, fishing boats in 1793. An English court held in 1798 that:
In former wars it has not been usual to make captures of these small
fishing vessels; but this rule was a rule of comity only, and not of legal
decision; it has prevailed from views of mutual accommodation between
neighboring countries, and from tenderness to a poor and industrious
people. In the present war there has, I presume, been sufficient reason for
changing this mode of treatment....161
Britain and France finally officially stopped seizing each other’s fishing boats at the
beginning of the nineteenth century, but again the British announced that their action
was “‘nowise founded upon an agreement but upon a simple concession;’ and ‘this
concession would always be subordinate to the convenience of the moment.’”162
Although the French Council of Prizes would, in 1801, declare that capture of fishing
vessels contradicted “the principles of humanity and the maxims of international

158

Id. at 694.

159

Our discussion is based on the account in The Paquete Habana, id. at 687-90.

160

Le Jean et Sara, 2 Code des Prises 721 (ed. 1784).

161

The Young Jacob and Johana, 1 C. Rob. 20 (1798).

162

The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 693 (quoting 6 Georg Friedrich Martens, Recueil des Traites 514 (2d ed.
1817-1835).

49

law,”163 it seems that the British view was a truer description of affairs, as even the
Supreme Court in The Paquete Habana seemed to acknowledge, remarking that up to this
time the exemption “may have rested in custom or comity, courtesy or concession....”164
Yet the Supreme Court must have included this history in order to buttress its claim
that a CIL norm had emerged in the nineteenth century — that a CIL norm was, in
effect, latent prior to the nineteenth century, ready to spring forth when conditions
ripened.
Four observations are in order here. First, states’ agreements and announcements
should be distinguished from their actions. If two states announce their intentions, but
neither carries them through, it is hard to say that the announcements create a norm of
CIL. Becuase the Court cites no evidence of the states’ behavior, and refers only to
statements, we cannot place much weight on the evidence that is provided. Second, one
must be cautious about generalizing from limited cases. If W and X have an agreement
in 1450, and Y and Z have a similar agreement in 1550, it does not follow that all are
part of any “implicit” agreement thereafter. Third, France’s and Britain’s positions on
the CIL norm were clearly tendentious. France, which had a weak navy, sought to
protect its coastal fishery by international agreement, whereas Britain, which has a
powerful navy, saw no reason to yield its advantage.
Fourth, it is interesting that the handful examples of agreements or understandings
are consistent with the conditions for cooperation in a bilateral repeat prisoner’s
dilemma. The states that were involved had neighboring or proximate coasts, enjoyed
about equal military power (in the sense that they were “major,” as opposed to minor,
powers), and confronted each other in bilateral conflicts. The proximity of coastlines
meant that they would have ample opportunity to prey on the fishing boats of each
other. Their equal power meant that no one could enjoy an advantage in this conflict.
A state could prey on the fishing boats of another state but at the same time would lose
its own fishing boats. Thus, cooperation could lead to mutual improvement, as
suggested by the model of the bilateral repeat prisoner’s dilemma. But if that is so,
what is striking is how rarely cooperation was achieved. Wars raged endlessly over
centuries, but one can find little evidence of cooperation, and there is no evidence that
states generally considered themselves obliged to refrain from seizing coastal fishing
vessels independently of the behavior of other states.
With this background, let us examine the evidence that persuaded the Supreme
Court that a CIL norm emerged in the nineteenth century. In 1806 England declared
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that it would not seize Prussian vessels carrying fresh fish and in 1810 it made a similar
declaration with respect to French vessels.165 Some treatise writers mentioned that
England and France did not disturb each other’s fisheries,166 though one author
dissented from this description.167 The United States did not seize coastal fishing boats
during the Mexican War on the east coast — though it did authorizes its navy to capture
“all vessels” under Mexican flag on the west coast, with no mention of an exemption for
fishing vessels.168 A treaty between the United States and Mexico, as did earlier treaties
between the United States and Prussia, prohibited the seizure of fishing boats in time of
war.169 France directed its navy not to seize coastal fishing vessels in the Crimean War
in 1854, in its war with Italy in 1859, and during the Franco-Prussian War in 1870,
though with a rather significant exception — “unless naval or military operations
should make it necessary.”170 England did destroy fishing boats during the Crimean
War, also for military purposes.171 Finally, since the English orders of 1806 and 1810,
“no instance has been found in which the exemption ... has been denied by England or
any other nation.”172 This is all the evidence that the Court recounts.173
These practices do not support a conclusion that a practice followed from a sense of
legal obligation emerged in the nineteenth century. The reasons for denying the
existence of a CIL norm in the nineteenth century are similar to the reasons for denying
the existence of a CIL norm prior to the nineteenth century.
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First, we have the problem of evidence. A few states announced an intention not to
seize fishing vessels during times of war, and other states remained silent on the issue,
without “denying” the exemption, to be sure, but without affirming it, either. The
Supreme Court does not cite any evidence about states’ actual practices, other than
England’s failure to conform with the exemption during the Crimean War.
Second, there is the problem of generalization. In a handful of isolated instances, a
few states announced that they would not seize fishing vessels during times of war.
Major wars were rare after Napolean, so their commitments were rarely tested. The
Mexican War was a one-sided affair. The Franco-Prussian War, also one-sided, was
short and did not involve major encounters at sea. Only the Crimean War and
American Civil Wars counted as major wars that involved important encounters at sea.
In the Crimean War the allies did seize fishing vessels while Russia was in no position
to harass allied fisheries hundreds of miles away. And we have no evidence about
behavior during the Civil War. The few, scattered instances of self-restraint do not
support the claim that states recognized a norm of CIL.
Third, although it is clear in retrospect that states were becoming increasingly
reluctant to seize fishing vessels as prizes, the most plausible explanation for this trend
is independent of developments in international law. Over the course of the nineteenth
century, militaries professionalized: they relied more on conscripts and less on
volunteers; more on nationals and less on mercenaries; more on wages and promotions
and less on booty.174 The reason for this trend appears to have been that advances in
technology and finance allowed states to field larger armies and sail larger navies, and
coordinate them in battle.175 Coordination relies on discipline, and discipline breaks
down when soldiers or sailors receive compensation when they seize property from
enemies.176 Although no explanation was provided in the legislative history, Congress’
abolition of most forms of prize in 1899177 suggests that authorities had come to believe
that prize was not a useful way of compensating naval officers and sailors. Other
modern states were no doubt in the same position. That coincidence of interest in the
professionaliziation of the military, along with the paucity of naval wars (see section A,
above), probably accounts for the lack of seizures of civilian fishing vessels when their
was not an immediate military necessity.
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This explanation is what we have called “coincidence of interest.” Navies
discouraged warships from seizing fishing vessels in order to maintain discipline. They
did this independently of the actions of other navies. Their behavior along this
dimension coincided because all navies had to submit to the requirements created by
the same new technological advances. Although it is possible that some states did not
seize fishing vessels because they were involved in a repeat prisoner’s dilemma, the
evidence for such a claim is thin. The North and the South in the Civil War may have
seen advantages in not attacking each other’s fishing vessels, but we have no evidence
that they engaged in such restraint. Similar comments could be made about the French
and the Prussians. And there is no evidence of a universal norm to which states
adhered because of a fear of multilateral retaliation or because of a sense of moral or
legal obligation.
The coincidence of interest hypothesis, moreover, is supported by the extremely
limited scope of the fishing exemption norm, as interpreted subsequently by courts and
treatise writers.178 As we have seen, the CIL norm was undercut by two important
exceptions: for deep-water or “commercial” vessels, and for vessels that are seized
under conditions of military necessity. The exceptions controlled all of the cases
involving the seizure of fishing vessels after the Napoleonic Wars, as far as we have
found. Indeed, The Paquete Habana is the only case that we have found, in which a
seizure was reversed, and it appears to have done so by ignoring the unlimited
exception for military exigency. Perhaps, the decision would have been otherwise if the
United States had claimed that the sailors on The Paquete Habana and on The Lola might
have been used as conscripts by Spain. That is surely a valid military reason for
detaining the vessels.179 One might argue that other cases did not arise because states
never seized “true” coastal fishing vessels out of a devotion to international law. Their
vessels not having been seized, the owners did not have to bring claims in prize courts.
But as we said at the start, the failure to seize vessels is consistent with the hypothesis
that navies had more valuable opportunities. Not seizing fishing vessels, like not
drilling holes in one’s own ships, was independently rational, not a matter of
cooperation.
One might argue that the proceeding discussion is beside the point, that, as a matter
of positive law, the Supreme Court’s decision that a CIL of prize existed brought that
CIL norm into existence. A CIL norm can be said to exist, however, only if it influences
the behavior of states in some way. There is no evidence that the rule laid down in The
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Paquete Habana had any influence on the behavior of any state, including the United
States, other than the United States’ payment of damages to the claimants in that case.
The Paquete Habana has been cited many times by American courts, but almost
always for its famous proposition that “international law is part of our law,”180 and
never as the basis of a decision in a prize case involving coastal fishing vessels. Indeed,
we have found no American cases involving the seizure of fishing boats subsequent to
the decision in The Paquete Habana. Although this is no doubt due in part to the decline
of prize, it does mean that there is no evidence that it influenced U.S. courts. As for its
influence on U.S. political officials, the Supreme Court acknowledged that its
interpretation of CIL in The Paquete Habana was subject to, among other things, a
“controlling executive or legislative act.”181 It was clear before and after the decision
that judicial interpretations of CIL are not binding on the federal political branches.182
Nor did The Paquete Habana have influence beyond the United States. The coastal
fishing exemption was ratified at the Hague Conference of 1907, where Britain for the
first time agreed to the exemption as a legal principle.183 The text reads: “Vessels used
exclusively for fishing along the coast or small boats in local trade are exempt from
capture, as well as their appliances, rigging, tackle, and cargo.”184 Many delegates
stated that the purpose of the exemption was to protect coastal fishing on the
humanitarian grounds that it was a small industry and fishermen were usually poor.185
But delegates also pointed out that fishing vessels may be used for military purposes,
that the fishermen themselves might convey information about naval movement to the
enemy, that the enemy might plant spies on the fishing vessels, that the enemy might
transport contraband on the fishing vessels, and that the fishing vessels might be used
as weapons.186 This explains why the exemption was limited to vessels “exclusively”
used for fishing. It also explains why the exemption did not specify what constituted a
fishing vessel or what it meant to fish along the coast, in effect leaving these important
issues to be determined by the nations involved. As Colombos explains:
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The Convention does not provide any limit of tonnage or crew, or any
special construction, type or propulsion required in order to bring a vessel
within the description of a fishing vessel. Nor does it prescribe the limit of
territorial waters or the extent of the high seas within which fishermen are
allowed to ply their trade. It was obviously felt by the framers of the
Convention that these limits vary according to different places where
fishing is carried out, and should best be left for determination to the
contacting Powers themselves.187
In short, the exemption did not extend to cases where nations would have a
significant interest in seizing fishing vessels.
There is no evidence that the Hague Convention or related agreements influenced
the treatment of coastal fishing vessels by belligerent states, or, for that matter, that the
norm of CIL identified in The Paquete Habana had any influence. Treatise writers say
that states did not seize fishing boats between 1898 and World War I, as though this
showed that all states respected the norm. But it does not, since the major European
powers and the United States were not at war with each other during that time. The
two major wars during the period do not support the existence of such a norm. The
Boers were landlocked, and they had no means to threaten British fishing.188 The
Japanese seized numerous Russian fishing vessels during their war, and the Japanese
Prize courts rejected claims by owners of the vessels, generally on the grounds that
these vessels were engaged in deep-sea fishing and were operated by companies.189
These courts acknowledged the existence of the Hague Convention, but they
distinguished it on the grounds that it applied only to small, coastal fishing vessels
owned by individuals, and they did not speculate as to whether the Hague Convention
might be binding in other circumstances. There is thus no evidence that the Hague
Convention or the Paquete Habana influenced behavior during the Russo-Japanese War.
The same is true of British prize courts during World War I. In The Berlin, the court
held that the exemption did not apply to the vessel in question because of its size (110
metric tons) and of the locations where it had been engaged in fishing, and was
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condemned.190 Although the court did cite The Paquete Habana, among other cases, as
evidence of the fishing exemption’s status as a norm of CIL, this acknowledgment
occurred in dicta, and therefore cannot be used as evidence of the influence of this rule
on state behavior.191 In The Marbrouck, the French Prize Court held that the exemption
did not apply to the vessels in question because they supplied blockaded ports.192 We
have found no other relevant cases arising from World War I,193 and there is evidence
that Germany sank fishing boats during World War I.194 During the first year of World
War II, Germany may have sunk as many as 200 fishing vessels.195 There have been
very few prize cases since World War I, and none that we know of involving fishing
vessels.
2.

Conclusion

The most parsimonious explanation for the evidence is that states seized fishing
vessels when they had a military reason to do so, whether the reason was to reward
sailors under the rules of prize, to clear away obstructions or spies, or to terrorize the
population -- and they did not seize fishing vessels when they had a military reason not
to so, for example, to avoid the trouble196 or to maintain naval discipline. One might
conjecture that a few cases, perhaps some of the interactions between France and
England, are attributable to the solution of bilateral repeated prisoner’s dilemmas.
Most cases, however, are best attributable to simple lack of anything to cooperate about.
If one insists on looking for a general pattern, one might conclude that most of the time
states did not seize fishing vessels after the Napoleonic Wars because most of the time
they were not at war, and when they were at war, their navies had better uses. One
may dignify this pattern of behavior with the CIL label, if one wants, as long as one
understands that it hardly reflects international cooperation or anything that is
noteworthy or desirable, and it is certainly not the result of states acting out of a sense
of legal or moral obligation.
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D. Territorial Sea
Prior to the eighteenth century, many powerful maritime nations proclaimed control
over large chunks of ocean.197 These nations were unable to sustain these claims,
however, and by the eighteenth century the seas became viewed in theory as free areas
that no nation could appropriate.198 One limitation on this so-called “freedom of the
seas” was the power that a nation retained over the territorial sea adjacent to its coast.
According to the doctrine of territorial jurisdiction, a nation had plenary jurisdiction
within its territorial sea and no jurisdiction without it. Other nations could freely
exploit and navigate the sea up to the boundary of a nation’s territorial sea. But they
could no more operate within a nation’s territorial sea without the nation’s permission
than they could operate in a nation’s territory without permission.199
Jurists originally conceived the territorial sea as the water a nation defended in order
to protect its territorial sovereignty.200 Bynkershoek famously captured the idea with
the apothegm that “the territorial sovereignty ends where the power of arms ends.”201
In the Seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the territorial sea did not have a settled
breadth.202 During this time Bynkershoek’s dictum transformed into the idea that a
nation’s sovereignty extended as far as it could fire a cannon ball. By the end of the
eighteenth century, many who embraced the cannon shot rule began to identify it with
a three-mile breadth, the approximate distance at the time that cannonballs could at that
time be projected.203
Conventional wisdom holds that a three-mile territorial sea was a rule of CIL during
most of the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century.204 The basis for this
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conventional wisdom is essentially as follows. In the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, the three-mile rule was officially championed by several countries -- most
notably the England and United States -- as a rule of CIL.205 Many nations that
attempted to assert a broader jurisdiction than three miles retracted these claims in the
face of threats or protests, usually from the United States or England.206 Sometimes,
nations asserting jurisdiction beyond the three-mile range paid damages.207 The threemile rule also appeared in numerous international agreements.208 And it was broadly - though not unanimously -- supported by jurists.209
Our theory suggests that the three-mile rule would have little influence on national
behavior, and that behaviors thought to support the three-mile rule would actually
reflect either coincidence of interest, coercion, a bilateral prisoner’s dilemma, or bilateral
coordination. It also suggests that behavioral patterns related to territorial jurisdiction
would not be stable, and would change with changes in state interests and technology.
This Section argues that the historical evidence supports these claims rather than the
traditional conception.
1.

Revisionist Account

Large tomes analyze the CIL of the territorial sea.210 We cannot examine here the
thousands of instances of state practice associated with the three-mile rule. But such a
detailed analysis is not necessary to see that there was no general and consistent
practice of states following the three-mile rule from a sense of obligation.
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The most immediate problem with the traditional account is that as many nations
rejected the three-mile rule as adhered to it.211 The Scandinavian countries always
asserted at least a four-mile territorial sea;212 Spain and Portugal consistently asserted
that the territorial jurisdiction band was six miles wide;213 Russia (and later the
U.S.S.R.) frequently asserted claims beyond the three-mile band;214 and various other
less significant countries claimed jurisdiction beyond the three-mile band.215 It is true
that some of these nations sometimes asserted jurisdiction only up to three miles in the
face of threats of retaliation, usually from England or the United States. To take one of
dozens of examples, in 1821 Russia claimed jurisdiction up to “100 Italian miles” off the
coasts of Eastern Siberia and Northwest America, but ultimately agreed to a three-mile
rule by treaty with England and the United States following protests from both
countries.216 In these cases, the resulting behavioral regularity is best explained as
coercion rather than as following a compulsory CIL norm. The coercion theory is
supported by the fact that threats and especially complaints were often not heeded, and
practice inconsistent with the three-mile rule frequently went unabated.217 It is also no
coincidence that the most successful enforcers were Britain, the preeminent naval
power, and the United States, a major naval power -- both states with a strong interest
in limiting encroachment on the freedom of the seas by the territorial sea, and the
power to enforce these interests.
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See Riesenfeld, supra note __, at 125-250. Riesenfeld summarizes his comprehensive 1942 examination of
state practice by concluding:
There are many nations, like Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Germany, Great
Britain and the Dominions, Iceland, Japan, Latvia, the Netherlands, Poland, the United States and
Venezuela, which do not adhere at all to [the three-mile rule]. On the other hand, there are likewise many
other nations which do not adhere at all to this principle, or do so only to a very limited extent, such as
Argentina, Columbia, Cuba, Finland, France, Greece, Honduras, Italy, Mexico, Norway, Peru, Portugal,
Rumania, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia.
Id. at 280. Jessup’s 1927 survey reaches broadly similar conclusions about state practice, but still maintained that a
core three-mile CIL rule existed. Jessup, supra note __, at 3-210.
212
See Heinzen, supra note __, at 605-12; Riesenfeld, supra note __, at 188-94; 221-30.
213

See Jessup, supra note __, at 41-43; Riesenfeld, supra note __, at 175-80.

214

See Jessup, supra note __, at 26-31; Riesenfeld, supra note __, at 194-203.

215

See Riesenfeld, supra note __, at 280.

216
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Thus, for example, Spain ignored some Britain complaints in the nineteenth century about Spanish
jurisdictional claims and seizures beyond the three-mile limit. See Riesenfeld, supra note __, at 146-47. “In 1874,
Great Britain tried . . . to bring about an international demarche of the maritime powers in favor of the three mile rule
and against the Spanish claims, but most of the other powers either did not want to commit themselves, or disagreed
with the British point of view.” Riesenfeld, supra note __, at 147.
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The absence of a general and consistent state practice is confirmed by the debates
and resolutions in various official conferences throughout the period, which reveal
stark disagreement about the breadth of the territorial sea.218 In addition, the treatise
writers were deeply split.219 Those who claimed that CIL required a three-mile band
were predominantly English-speaking jurists who aped their nations’ views of CIL.220
Turning to the details of state practice, many nations throughout the period enforced
anti-smuggling and related security laws outside of the three-mile band.221 The
standard view explains these examples away as “exceptions” to the three mile rule or as
actions that other nations did not challenge for reasons of “comity.”222 A better
explanation is that the coastal nation has a strong interest in asserting jurisdiction
beyond three miles in this context, and other nations usually have little reason to
encourage smuggling into the coastal nation. This is not to suggest that all antismuggling regimes created such a coincidence of interest. Sometimes the assertion of
anti-smuggling jurisdiction beyond the three-mile limit resulted in protests, although
218

For example, widespread disagreement about the scope of the territorial sea precipitated the North Sea
Fisheries Convention of 1882. See Fulton, supra note __, at 630-32; Riesenfeld, supra note __, at 149-50. Although the
parties to the Convention eventually agreed by treaty to a three-mile rule for fishing, the conference leading to the
Convention was marked by disagreement about territorial sea requirements under CIL. Similarly, at the 1930 Hague
Conference for the Progressive Codification of CIL, twenty states sought a three-mile territorial, four states sought a
four-mile territorial sea, and twelve states sought a six-mile territorial sea, and many states sought rights over
contiguous zones beyond three miles. See Churchill & Lowe, supra note __, at 66. Both the first and second United
Nations Law of the Sea conferences -- in 1958 and 1960 -- tried and failed to agree upon a limit for the territorial sea.
Id.; Heinzen, supra note __, at 645-48. On the inability of various private groups devoted to codification to agree on
a territorial sea limit during this period, see Riesenfeld, supra note __, at 99-111.
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Riesenfeld’s comprehensive analysis of the treatises during the period led him to the following conclusion:
Of the 113 different authors who expressed views on the question of the territorial sea between 1800 and
1899, fifty two favored the cannon shot rule, fifteen the cannon shot rule or the three-mile rule, twenty seven
the straight three mile rule, and one a different fixed measure, while eighteen took the view that the
question should be answered on different grounds taking account of the interests involved, and that the
states were free to choose this method. Of the 114 different authors who have dealt with the question since
1900, fourteen favored the cannon shot rule, six the cannon shot or three-mile rule, forty-one the straight
three-mile rule, and one a different measure, while fifty-two took the view either that there was no
international agreement on the question and that states were free to make any reasonable claim, or that the
question should be solved according to international law on a basis which varies according to the interests
and circumstances involved.
Riesenfeld, supra note __, at 279-80. Riesenfeld notes that the figures should be read with some caution because some
writers copied from others without independent analysis. Id. at 279.
220
See Fulton, supra note __, at 681.
221

See Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240, 258 (1891) (“governments, . . . for the prevention of frauds
on its revenue, exercise an authority beyond [the three-mile] limit”); see generally Jessup, supra note __, at 19, 25, 7696 (surveying this practice); Fulton, supra note __, at 594 (same point).
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these protests did not always, or even usually, result in a retreat to the three-mile
line.223 Even a relatively weak state is in a good position to patrol coastal waters; so a
large state that seeks to preserve the three-mile line may be too weak to its enforce its
will when many weak states violate the rule.
A related problem was the scope of the band of territorial sea in which a neutral
nation’s ships could remain immune from belligerent capture. During the period in
question, some nations asserted a three-mile zone of neutrality, but many other nations
asserted zones of neutrality beyond three miles.224 These regulations were rarely tested
because there were relatively few maritime wars in the seventy years prior to World
War I.225 But the few international clashes in this context are revealing. For example,
during World War I Britain successfully checked Norway’s assertion of a four-mile
neutrality zone by capturing Norwegian ships three miles outside of Norway; but at the
same time England (and the United States) acquiesced in Italy’s assertion of a six-mile
neutrality zone “out of courtesy.”226 Scholars have reconciled these actions by arguing
that the Norwegian example exemplifies the true CIL rule and that the Italian deviation
was permitted out of comity. A better explanation is that England had the power to
coerce compliance with the three-mile rule and a significant interest in doing so against
Norwegian shipping because of its destination to Germany, but it had no interest in
enforcing the three-mile rule against its ally Italy, and thus acquiesced. The relationship
between England and Norway was one of coercion; the relationship between England
and Italy was one of coincidence of interest.
The customs and the neutrality deviations from the ostensible three-mile rule are
examples of the larger principle that a nation could assert jurisdiction beyond the threemile limit in self-defense or for self-preservation.227 This “exception” to the three-mile
principle – analogous to the military necessity exemption in the prize cases or the
national security exception to ambassadorial immunity – suggests that the three-mile
rule did not limit national action in cases where nations had powerful interests in
exceeding the limit. A similar story explains the practice of asserting jurisdiction
beyond three miles over the rare, valuable, and exhaustible sedentary fisheries such as
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For example, England complained about the 1853 Spanish seizure of the British ship Fortuna, but Spain
ignored the complaint, and England dropped the matter after failing to rally support from other nations for its
position. See Riesenfeld, supra note __, at 146-47.
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For a few of many examples, see Jessup , supra note __, at 25, 47-48, 103-05.
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coral and oysters.228 The same idea inheres in the single exception to exclusive
jurisdiction within the three-mile zone, the CIL right of innocent passage.229 The right
of innocent passage permits a foreign ship to pass through the territorial sea unless the
ship does something to prejudice the security, public policy, or fiscal interests of the
state.230 There is indeed a long-term behavioral regularity of nations not seizing foreign
ships passing close to shore that are deemed innocent. But nations have varying and
self-serving definitions of innocence; the “rule” does nothing to prevent a nation from
seizing a ship that the nation perceives to be a threat to its interest. What international
scholars consider to be CIL is nothing more than a description of states acting in their
national interest: states seize ships passing through their territorial sea exactly when
they have reason to do so.231 All of these examples are inconsistent with the traditional
account of the three-mile rule; all have straightforward explanations within our
framework.
Another embarrassment to the traditional account that makes sense within our
theory concerns the double standards of the three-mile rule’s proponents. During the
same period in which Great Britain championed and enforced the three-mile rule, it
acted to preserve its ability to assert jurisdiction beyond three miles when it suited its
needs.232 For example, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the English
Hovering Acts asserted customs jurisdiction beyond the three-mile range.233 And in
legislation and treaty-making during the late nineteenth century, England was careful
not to commit itself to the three-mile rule generally, and to preserve its rights to assert
jurisdiction beyond the three-mile limit with respect, for example, to certain fishing
rights, bays, folded coasts, pearls and coral banks.234 Similarly, the United States
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Cf. William Edward Hall, A Treatise on International Law 215 (7th ed. 1915) (“the state is . . . indifferent to . .
. what happens among a knot of foreigners so passing through her [territorial sea] as not to come in contact with the
population. To attempt to exercise jurisdiction in respect of acts producing no effect beyond the vessel, and not
tending to do so, is of advantage to no one.”)
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See Riesenfeld, supra note __, at 131, 148-154, 281; see also Fulton, supra note __, at 651-52 (“Great Britan has
“taken pains to make it clear that in adopting a three-mile limit for particular purposes they do not abrogate their
right to the farther extent of sea that may be necessary for other purposes.”).
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England repealed the Hovering Acts in the late nineteenth century but did not fully eliminate its authority
to assert customs and related jurisdiction over foreign ships beyond three miles. See Riesenfeld, supra note __, at 131,
142.
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This point is detailed in Riesenfeld, supra note __, at 148-171. Prominent examples of this phenomenon are:
(A) England’s 1878 Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act provided that criminal jurisdiction would be exercised for
three miles to sea, but which also preserved jurisdiction beyond the three-mile range “as is necessary for the defence
and security of such dominions,” see id. at 148-49; Fulton, supra note __, at 591-92. (B) The 1881 North Sea Fisheries
Convention included a three-mile rule for fishing rights over English objections. England resisted the explicit three-
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protested Russian restrictions on sealing beyond three miles in the Bering Sea when
Russia owned the sea, but after the cession of Alaska to the United States in 1867, the
United States, pursuant to an act of Congress asserting U.S. dominion over the entire
Bering Sea, seized seal hunters in the Sea beyond the three-mile limit.235 This is one of
many examples of the United States “var[ying] her principles and claims as to the extent
of territorial waters, according to her policy at the time.”236 These phenomena show
that, as in the other case studies, nations will assert changing and inconsistent readings
of CIL consistent with their interests.
Throughout the period, the greatest clashes over territorial jurisdiction concerned
the area of water to which a nation’s citizens would have exclusive fishing rights.
Coastal nations with weak navies sought to maximize the breadth of exclusive fishing
rights; nations with powerful navies sought to minimize the scope of exclusivity. There
was little stability in actual practice.
As one would expect from their proximity and shared body of narrow water,
England and France (and to a lesser degree England and Belgium and England and
Holland) frequently clashed over the three-mile rule for fishing.237 To the extent that
the three-mile rule was effectively embraced, it was done so by virtue of carefully
negotiated bilateral and multilateral treaties rather than customary practice, and even
these treaties were frequently violated. Both sides captured ships of the other fishing
beyond the three-mile limit, and both sides had ships that fished within the other’s
three-mile limit. To be sure, the history was not one of unremitting chaos. There were
short periods and limited contexts in which the two nations engaged in what might be
called cooperative behavior, almost invariably pursuant to a treaty. The explanation for
such cooperation is that two states with access to a fishery find themselves in a bilateral
mile rule in order to maintain flexibility to protect the burgeoning trawling fishing practice of its citizens on foreign
coasts. See Riesenfeld, supra note __, at 152; Fulton, supra note __, at 632-34. The English implementing statute
made clear that the three-mile zone only extended to matters explicitly included within the treaty, and that England
maintained jurisdiction beyond the three-mile zone in a variety of contexts, see Riesenfeld, supra note __, at 149-52.
(C) The Scotch Herring Fishery Act of 1889, which prohibited certain forms of trawling beyond the three-mile limit in
Moray Firth (a “firth” is a Scotch term for a long, narrow sea inlet), and under which numerous Norwegian boats
fishing beyond three miles (including British fishermen registered under the Norwegian flag) were prosecuted, see
Jessup, supra note __, at 430-36; Riesenfeld, supra note __, at 158-60; Meyer, supra note __, at 145-165. The British
government eventually restored the fines and released the ships’ masters, but only after Norway agreed to prevent
Norwegian trawlers from entering Firth, and not because of a rule of CIL. Meyer, supra note __, at 142-43;
Riesenfeld, supra note __, at 158-160; but see Jessup, supra note __, at 430-36 (claiming that three-mile CIL rule
vindicated in Moray Firth controversy). (D) England consistently asserted jurisdiction beyond three miles for
purposes of sedentary fishing, such as pearls and coral. See Jessup, supra note __, at 13-17.
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repeat prisoner’s dilemma, and when conditions are favorable, cooperation will occur.
Consistent with this theory, the most successful instances of cooperation -- such as the
harvesting of oysters -- occurred both sides would clearly be harmed by overexploitation, and violations were relatively easy to identify.
Throughout the period in question, Spain and Russia tried to assert fishing rights
beyond the three-mile zone. In some contexts they succeeded. More often they were
met with threats of force from England and the United States, and backed away to
defend only a three-mile band. This is thought by some to evidence a rule of CIL. A
better explanation, of course, is that England and the United States had much stronger
navies and powerful interests in maximizing areas in which their nationals could fish.
It is not surprising that nations with powerful navies would tend to desire the
narrowest possible territorial sea, and would usually get their way.
The only puzzle is why the United States and England recognized even a three-mile
territorial sea. The answer is surely that the neither the United States nor England was
powerful enough both to provide safe passage to their civilian fishing vessels along the
coast of a hostile power and to defend their fishing vessels close to home. Every state
has a stronger interest in protecting coastal seas than maintaining rights in distant seas
for the simple reason that their fishing industry can more cheaply harvest the coastal
seas, which are close to shore, than distant seas. In addition, it is considerably easier to
defend coastal seas, both by ship and from the shore, than to maintain power over a
distant sea. Thus, every state of roughly similar power has a strong interest in agreeing
not to interfere with the coastal fisheries of other states, in return for a commitment not
to interfere with their own coastal fisheries. This is a classic coordination game, and the
only problem -- which is characteristic of such games -- is coordinating on a particular
area. What is needed is a focal point. Any band defined by a constant distance from
the coastline is simpler, more “focal,” than alternatives, such as particular longitudes
and latitudes. So it is no surprise that the fights about the territorial sea for fishing
purposes was couched in terms of band widths. To the extent that the three-mile rule
was frequently (though certainly not exclusively) invoked during our period, this is
explained by the fact that three miles comported with the eighteenth century cannon
shot mark, the rough distance from which a nation could protect its seas from shore.238
But of course states would have different interests over the size of the band, as the
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optimal size for each state would vary according to local technologies and economic
needs, and here we would expect the powerful states to prevail over the weak states.239
Finally, the fishing example illustrates how various exogenous shocks led to changes
in behavior.
A prominent example was trawling, a late nineteenth century
development.240 Trawling was a profitable but destructive form of fishing; trawling
just outside the three-mile band disrupts fishing within the band much more than prior
fishing methods. In addition, the rise of the steamship (also late nineteenth century)
made trawling possible at much further distances. These developments heightened
conflicts over the fishing zones, and precipitated the expansion of asserted and
defended fishing zones early in the twentieth century.241 It also explains why England
began to hedge on its formal assertion of the three mile rule in the late nineteenth
century. England wanted to assert trawling broadly abroad but protect fisheries at
home. This led it to refrain from asserting a well-defined rule, relying instead on
standards that it -- the preeminent naval power -- could interpret flexibly to suit its
needs. Another example of how exogenous shocks can change behavior: as more
nations gained independence, the behavioral regularities became less common.242
Coordination games become exponentially more difficult as the number of participants
increase. Although a rule may evolve that governs fishing among a few large states, it
is unlikely that a rule could evolve that would coordinate the behavior of dozens of
states.243
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This game can be viewed as a Battle of the Sexes: every state had an interest in a free coastal area, but
different states preferred larger or smaller coastal areas. To take a simple example, suppose that state X specializes in
a certain kind of fishery x, which extends from its shore to 2 miles from state Y’s shore. State Y specializes in fishery
y, which extends from its shore to 3 miles from X’s shore. Each state would also like to fish from the fishery in which
it does not specialize. In the absence of coordination, both states would fish from both fisheries, leading to
exhaustion. If they could coordinate by agreeing to specalize in one fishery, exhaustion would be avoided, but such
coordination would be difficult to monitor. A territorial sea rule would be easier to monitor, but each state has an
interest in a different rule. X prefers a 2 mile rule, because this would allow it to exploit its entire fishery; and Y
prefers a 3 mile rule, because this would allow it to exploit its entire fishery plus some of fishery x. Either rule could
be an equilibrium, but as relative power changes, one can imagine that the loser under the existing rule would
challenge it, and seek by treaty a change to the rule that it favors. See supra note __.
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As Brown notes of the state of affairs before trawling:
Given the technology of the period, there was little significant conflict between the interests of coastal
communities in the fish stocks adjacent to the coast and of foreign, distant water fishing states, and in any
event even if there had been an awareness of such conflict, the number of independent coastal states so
affected would have been so small and their power and lack of coordination as such that no serious
challenge to freedom of fishing could possible have been mounted.
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2. Conclusion
The CIL of the territorial sea was never uniform and never static. Nations followed
different behavioral patterns in different maritime contexts in accordance with their
interests and power. Behaviors changed during relatively short periods of time. The
ostensible three-mile rule did little if any work in affecting the behavior of nations.
Sometimes one nation had an interest in asserting jurisdiction beyond the three-mile
limit, and no other nation had an interest in preventing this act. This was coincidence of
interest. Other times a nation tried to assert jurisdiction but were met by a threat of
retaliation from a more powerful nation. This was coercion. In yet other contexts
nations engage in mutually beneficial cooperative behavior in refraining from
exercising jurisdiction beyond a three-mile limit. This can be seen as a prisoner’s
dilemma or a coordination game. The many puzzles, inconsistencies, or “violations”
that appear under the traditional view make sense when viewed through the lens of the
various and changing interests at stake.
Rather than following an exogenous rule, then, states acted in their self-interest, and
their behavior changed as their interests changed. What is called CIL is simply an afterthe-fact description of states’ behavior. In arguing for a rule of CIL, jurists once again
commit the fallacies of (a) inducing a rule of CIL from a few cases that amount to a
behavioral regularity in a specific context during a short period of time; (b) labeling
behavioral patterns inconsistent with the ostensible rule as “exceptions” or “comity”; (c)
viewing a coincidence of interest or coercion situation as evidence of cooperation; (d)
and analyzing behavioral patterns without considering the different underlying logics
that these patterns exemplify.
IV.

Extensions

In this Section we extend the theory beyond CIL to consider its implications for
related issues. We consider the domestic constitutional arrangements for identifying
and enforcing CIL, and the relevance of our analysis for treaties, international
organizations, and international human rights law.
A. National Interests and the Domestic Enforcement of CIL
In this Part we relax our assumption that a state’s actions reflect a unitary national
interest, and discuss domestic constitutional arrangements for identifying and enforcing
CIL. For reasons having to do with familiarity and ease of exposition, we use the
example of the United States Constitution.
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Our theory of CIL offers an explanation for multinational behavioral regularities as a
function of national self-interest. Thus far we have assumed a simplistic, unitary
conception of a nation’s interest. This assumption is clearly artificial. The national
interest is a complex amalgam of the interests of domestic individuals and institutions.
In the contexts in which we are concerned, calculation of the national interest requires
the identification and balance of domestic and foreign relations priorities. This
calculation is invariably influenced by domestic processes and institutions, and is
invariably distorted by numerous domestic agency problems.244 It is unclear whether
the concept of national interest is coherent; it is certain that it is controversial.245
We have tried to skirt these difficult issues by relying on the assessment of the
national interest identified by a nation’s political leadership. Even this strategy
oversimplifies, for political leadership is in many contexts not unitary. For example, the
United States divides the determination of the national interest in foreign relations
along several dimensions among the President, the Congress, and the Senate.246 In
addition, of course, agency problems remain. Nonetheless, the strategy of relying on
political branch determinations of the national interest seems both appropriate and
consistent with our theory. Every form of government overcomes the many difficulties
in determining the national interest in foreign affairs by delegating the task to national
political figures. And there is invariably a domestic rule of recognition that sorts out
which political figure has ultimate authority in which context. We do not claim that
national leadership accurately identifies the national interest; only that it does so
definitively.247
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For a theoretical analysis of the interrelationship between domestic and international politics, see Robert
Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 Int’l Org. 427 (1988); see also DoubleEdged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics (1993) (Peter Evans, Harold Jacobsen, and Robert
Putnam, eds.) (collection of essays elaborating on Putnam’s model).
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The President is generally acknowledged to be the country’s representative in foreign relations, see United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Cirp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). But the Constitution gives Congress numerous foreign
relations powers (subject to Presidential veto and congressional override) and gives the Senate an important role to
play in appointing ambassadors and consenting to treaties. As Corwin correctly noted, the Constitution’s allocation
of foreign relations power among the political branches is an “invitation to struggle” for control of the conduct of
U.S. foreign relations. Edward Corwin, The President: Office and Powers, 1787-1984 (5th ed. 1984), at 201.
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by numerous governmental and non-governmental actors operating at a variety of levels and contexts. See, for
example, Slaughter et al., supra note __. We have no quibble with this point, which does not have much relevance to
CIL considered alone. The identification and application of CIL is performed primarily by governmental actors in
accordance with a strict hierarchy of authority. In this section we are trying to explain how that hierarchy is
consistent with, and enlightened by, our theory.
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As the four case studies show, a nation’s political figures -- usually but not always in
the national executive branch -- determine a nation’s views about the content of CIL and
order national actions that either contribute to or defy the behavioral regularities that
are said to constitute CIL. Our theory claims that a nation’s political figures will usually
base these actions on their best assessment of the nation’s interest,248 and will
occasionally -- in bilateral prisoner’s dilemma and related situations -- direct the nation
to act against immediate advantage to obtain cooperative benefits. A nation’s
commitment to a particular view of CIL as in its best interest can take various forms,
including treaties and statutes that purport to codify or incorporate CIL, or Executive
commands, orders or agreements that announce a nation’s views on CIL or direct action
in accordance with a particular conception of CIL.
The Executive branch can ensure enforcement of many of these commitments. The
President can, for example, order the Navy to refrain from seizing enemy goods, or
direct the foreign minister to encourage adoption of a particular position in a diplomatic
conference, or threaten retaliation against an enemy. All of this is consistent with our
theory, and with the non-controversial point that national political leaders in a
legitimate government are the best suited to identify and enforce the national interest in
these contexts.
Sometimes, however, national commitments related to CIL will require domestic
enforcement by courts. This introduces the problem of the domestic allocation of
authority between courts and political actors in identifying and enforcing CIL. Some
aspects of this problem seem consistent with our theory. For example, when the
political branches incorporate their views about CIL into a treaty, statute, or executive
agreement, courts enforce these enactments. Courts will apply a domestic statute or
treaty even in the face of the claim that the enactment violates CIL. For courts, the
political branches’ official views about the content of CIL trump all other sources of
CIL.249
It is often the case, however, that courts must apply CIL without any guidance from
the political branches. The political branches perhaps specify in a treaty or statute that
CIL controls a particular issue without specifying the content of the CIL rule that it is in
the national interest to follow. In other, increasingly rare, circumstances, courts apply
CIL directly, as “part of our law,” even in the absence of any guidance from the political

248

It does not matter to our account whether there are distortions in this assessment.

249

Restatement (Third), supra note __, at § 112, cmt. See Philip Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary
International Law, 33 U.C.LA. L. Rev. 665 (1986).

68

branches.250 In these contexts, courts must determine the content of CIL on their own
and enforce it. How does this practice fit with our theory? Suppose, in the example
from Section II, that fishing boat owners from state j bring suit against state i, seeking
compensation for the seizure of the boat by the navy of state i. The boat owners will
argue that state i violated a norm of CIL. How does the court rule?
First, even when the Executive’s views are not officially enacted, courts almost
always defer to the Executive’s informal representation about the content of CIL.251
This can be seen as courts deferring to the branch of the government in a best position
to determine both the strategic situation implicated by the case and the decision that
would most further the national interest.
We must acknowledge that the famous The Paquete Habana decision stands as a rare
counterexample. The Admiral of the Navy, with the apparent approval of the Secretary
of the Navy, justified the seizure of the fishing smack at issue in that case on the
grounds that the smack had a “semi-military character” and contained excellent sailors
that might assist the Spanish cause.252 In its brief to the Court, the Executive branch
argued that the seizure had a military justification, constituted a valid act of Executive
discretion, and was fully consistent with CIL, which contained no exemption for fishing
smacks.253 In rejecting these representations, the Court may have been influenced by
the fact that the President had proclaimed that the United States would conduct the war
consistently with “the law of nations” and “the present views of nations.”254
Nonetheless, The Paquete Habana is an exception to the usual pattern of courts deferring
to the Executive’s representations about the content of CIL, an exception rarely
repeated, especially in cases with more significance than post-war determination of the
validity of the seizure of a fishing smack.255
Second, in the absence of Executive guidance, our theory suggests that the court is in
effect deputized to determine the course of action in the national interest. The court
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looks to all the paraphernalia of the jurisprudence of CIL -- the treatises and the history
books, the UN resolutions and the pronouncements of executives, the formal
understandings and the unratified treaties. But this chore can serve two different
purposes. First, when the court is confident that it can determine which course of action
is in the national interest, it will use CIL to rationalize the result. Biased national court
interpretation of CIL is a well-known phenomenon. Second, when a court is uncertain
about what is in the national interest, it can read the indicia of CIL to try to make a more
objective determination of dominant pertinent behavioral regularities.
These
regularities are not binding on the court as a form of law. Rather, they reveal
information about what other states have done in like circumstances and thus they
serve as evidence about what the host state’s interest may be in the case at hand.256
B. Treaties
As we explained above, CIL that reflects states’ overcoming of a prisoner’s dilemma
can originate only under special conditions. Among other things, it is necessary that
states be able to recognize when an action is cooperative and when an action is not.
Sometimes, the status quo will supply a focal point. For example, at time 0 states do not
seize the fishing vessels of other states because their navies have more valuable
opportunities; at time 1 these opportunities disappear and a prisoner’s dilemma comes
into existence. If each state persists in the status quo, and does not seize a fishing
vessel, then, as long as all of the conditions for cooperation in a repeat game are met, a
CIL norm against seizing fishing vessels will develop. By contrast, if states seize each
other’s fishing vessels at time 0, there is no natural way to coordinate a cessation. If one
state refrains from seizing the vessels of the other as a way of suggesting that joint
restraint would be a superior alternative, the other state might misinterpret this action
as a change in the first state’s payoffs rather than as an offer to cooperate.
An obvious solution to this problem is communication. If the first state announces
that it will discontinue seizure of fishing vessels but only as long as the other state does
the same, the second state will not misinterpret the first state’s actions. It might not
believe the threat, but it will understand the threat. If it does understand the threat, it
may desist as well and cooperation would result.
In most circumstances, however, optimal cooperation is complex. State i might be
willing to stop seizing the fishing vessels of state j but only as long as it is certain that
256
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the crews of the vessels are not spying on state i’s military operations or transporting
weapons. State i might thus insist that “cooperation” in this game allows each state to
stop and search fishing vessels and detain them but only if they present a threat. If no
communication could exist, state j might interpret such unilateral action by state i as a
violation of the focal understanding not to seize fishing vessels. The advantage of
communications is that they allow states to engage in optimal cooperation, rather than
engaging in moderately valuable actions that are dependent on focal points that already
exist. Communication allows states to create new focal points.
We hypothesize that this is a primary function of many treaties. A treaty records the
actions that will count as cooperative moves in an ongoing repeat prisoner’s dilemma or
coordination game. Thus, the treaty itself does not have independent binding force.257
States refrain from violating treaties (when they do) because they fear retaliation from
the treaty partner, not because they feel some sort of normative obligation.258 When the
treaty sets out clearly what counts as a cooperative action, it becomes more difficult for
a state to engage in opportunism then deny that the action violated the requirements of
a cooperative game.259
We do not have the space to pursue this idea here, and leave it for a future project.
We mention this idea only to show how our theory of CIL would cohere with a theory
of treaties, the essential point being that like CIL, treaties can emerge endogenously
from the rational behavior of states. CIL norms are labels attached to behavioral
regularities that emerge in various strategic settings; treaties can be labels attached to
certain pronouncements that emerge in various strategic settings. The pronouncements,
like behavioral regularities, occur because states believe that they serve their
interests.260 The main difference between the two forms of law is that CIL evolves in
the absence of clear and authoritative communication between interested states, which
makes it difficult to achieve cooperation or coordination by this means, whereas treaties
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are a product of authoritative communication and thus are more likely than Cil to
produce cooperation or coordination.
C. International Organizations
As the treaty example shows, there are means besides a decentralized customary
law to coordinate nations’ interests and induce international cooperation. In this
century, and especially since World War II, a huge variety of international
organizations and related regimes have grown out of multilateral treaties: the United
Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, The GATT, and on and on.
To a much greater extent than lawyers, political scientists have examined the ways that
these organizations induce international cooperation.261 Many political scientists
conclude that these organizations can affect international behaviors by generating
information, facilitating communication and negotiation, structuring interactions, and
providing the institutional mechanisms needed to enforce selective incentives for
national action.262 Others are skeptical. They either doubt that international
organizations facilitate cooperation, or they maintain that these organizations exercise
no exogenous influence on national behavior, but rather merely reflect underlying
national interests and power.263
Our analysis has no direct implications for this debate, which has little to do with
CIL. Sanguine claims about international organizations can be attacked from a
perspective consistent with our theory. For example, Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom
argue that there is less international cooperation in international regulatory regimes
than meets the eye because the regimes “require only modest departures from what
[nations] would have done in the absence of an agreement.”264 In other words, what
appears to be compliance might in many circumstances be something approaching
coincidence of interest. But claims about the efficacy of international organizations
261
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might also be consistent with our theory of CIL. The theory does not purport to give an
exhaustive account of all international behavioral regularities, but rather only those
behavioral regularities thought to constitute CIL. Our argument is against the concept
of CIL viewed as an independent and exogenous influence on national behavior. We do
not claim that it is impossible for nations to facilitate international cooperation, or for
nations to create institutions that influence international behaviors.
D.

International Human Rights Law

The traditional rules of CIL that we have examined thus far regulate inter-national
relations. Following the Holocaust, the international community expanded the focus of
international law to include governance of the way a nation treats its citizens.265 Since
World War II, nations have signed scores of multilateral human rights treaties that
purport to regulate the way they treat their citizens with regard to such issues as
genocide, torture, and various civil rights.266 These treaties are in effect promises by
one nation to others that it will protect the human rights of its citizens. And these
treaties, in turn, are said to give rise to a flourishing CIL of human rights.267
This CIL of human rights differs from traditional CIL.268 It purports to make
individuals in addition to states the subjects of international law. Because many nations
systematically and overtly mistreat their citizens, almost all of the CIL of human rights
makes no pretense of reflecting a universal behavioral regularity. Instead, it purports to
be based on the broad written or verbal assent to human rights norms as reflected in
multilateral treaties, General Assembly Resolutions, and domestic enactments. This
conception of CIL is even more mysterious and controversial than the traditional
conception, because it eschews CIL’s traditional grounding in state consent, and
replaces it with a vague and easily manipulable consensus criterion. Nonetheless, CIL
so conceived is important to the theory and rhetoric of international human rights law,
for it purports to impose obligations on nations that have not fully embraced human
rights treaties.
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We are once again less interested in the internal logic of the CIL of human rights
than we are with the international behaviors associated with it. Recall that the CIL of
human rights does not purport to reflect a behavioral regularity among nations. The
CIL of human rights thus raises two questions that call for explanation. First, why is
there such a gap between what the law purports to require and the actual behavior of
nations? (This question is often phrased in terms of international human rights law’s
poor enforcement record.) Second, what accounts for the fact that some CIL
prohibitions -- for example, the prohibition on genocide -- do appear to track a general
behavioral regularity?
We begin with the exceptional case, the CIL prohibition on genocide. Some nations
in history have committed genocide, but most nations most of the time do not.269
International legal scholars use this behavioral regularity of not committing genocide,
in combination with many pronouncements (including the Genocide treaty270), as
evidence that nations respect the prohibition on genocide as a legal obligation. As
usual, this account is consistent with the appearance of a compliance pattern but cannot
explain either violations of the norm or the reason why nations appear to comply with
it. A better explanation is that the absence of genocide reflects a coincidence of interest.
With notable exceptions,271 there was a general behavioral regularity of nations not
committing genocide both before and after the development of the ostensible
international law prohibition late in this century. Most nations lack any reason to
annihilate an ethnical, racial, or religious group among its citizenry. And even nations
that has reason or interest to commit genocide find it very costly -- in military,
economic, or moral terms -- to do so. This is why genocides have been rare throughout
history.
This point generalizes. There are an infinite number of ways that nations can abuse
their citizens. Nations do not deny speech rights to people who have blue eyes, and
almost all nations do not mutilate the genitals of young girls. They do not do so
because they have no reason or interest to do so. Following a norm from a sense of
legal obligation has nothing to do with it.
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Now consider cases in which nations do have a reason to abuse their citizens.272
Governments often find it useful to torture certain individuals, or to deny to citizens
certain civil rights such as freedom of speech. In these and other cases where
governments benefit from abusing citizens, a gap exists between what the law purports
to require and the actual behavior of nations. The characteristics of this gap between
law and practice are consistent with our theory.
We certainly would not expect to see cooperation on this issue. Consider a world of
two nations, A which abuses its citizens and B which does not. A gains nothing if both
nations agree to stop abusing citizens. The same is true if both A and B abuse their
citizens. They lose something and gain nothing from a mutual agreement to provide
greater protection to their citizens. Cooperation is obviously no more likely among nnations. Assuming for the moment an absence of coercion (i.e. selective incentives such
as forgone economic aid, threat of military intervention, or diplomatic ostracization), a
nation that violates its citizens human rights will have no incentive to comply with
more restrictive international human rights norms.
This all suggests that we would expect nations not otherwise inclined to protect
human rights to abide by international human rights law only if other powerful nations
enforce compliance. Consider the international slave trade. By the end of the
nineteenth century, the slave trade had all but died out, and by the middle of the
twentieth century it was prohibited by various international treaties. The behavioral
regularity of not trading slaves is best explained by the fact that Britain and to a lesser
degree the United States developed a national interest in abolishing the international
slave trade, and enforced their will with the threat of military force.273 We need not
take a position in the debate whether religious, economic, or other reasons accounted
for the British and American governments’ decision to ban international slavery.274
Whatever the reason, the national interest of these two countries changed when their
governments decided to ban international slavery, and a new behavioral regularity
arose -- according to which states no longer traded slaves -- only because they militarily
punished or threatened to punish those states which violated its interest.275
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A similar coercion story explains the patterns of enforcement, and limited efficacy,
of modern international human rights law. Consider the position of the United States,
the world’s leading enforcer of human rights. The United States sometimes has reason - grounded in domestic political factors and geopolitical concerns -- in reducing a
foreign nation’s mistreatment of its citizens. But it is very costly for the United States to
enforce international human rights, and it tends to do so in two situations that present
special enforcement incentives. The first occurs when one nation’s human rights
violations pose a significant adverse threat to the United States. This explains the
United States intervention in the former Yugoslavia (to avoid a broader European
conflict) and Haiti (to avoid a domestic crisis in Florida). A second context where we
find human rights enforcement is when the federal government receives domestic
political benefits from enforcement, and the costs of such enforcement -- in economic or
military terms -- are low. Examples of this phenomenon are U.S. economic sanctions
against weak and unpopular countries like Cuba and Myanmar. In general, the United
States will not enforce human rights if enforcement is costly and the strategic benefits of
enforcement are low or uncertain. This explains why the absence of human rights law
enforcement against China (a powerful military and economic foe) and Saudi Arabia
(an important ally).
This enforcement pattern -- against weak foes but not against strong foes or friends - is consistent with the claim that the efficacy of human rights law will track the
enforcement interests of powerful nations. So too is the fact that the core international
human rights, and the ones most widely embraced, mirror the rights protected by the
United States Constitution.276 Also consistent with the coercion story is the fact that at
the same time the United States is enforcing human rights law abroad, it is thumbing its
nose at international human rights law at home.277 Although United States domestic
law provides abundant protections for human rights, many practices in the United
States -- the juvenile death penalty, prison and police standards, and certain
immigration acts -- fall below the ostensible requirements of international human rights
law.278 But the United States resists application of this law to itself. It has been slow to
assent to human rights treaties, and when it does assent it attaches reservations and
declarations that render the assent meaningless.279 And while United States domestic
276
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law permits domestic enforcement of the CIL of human rights law against foreign
government officials, it does not permit enforcement of this law against domestic
officials.280 This double standard has been criticized as hypocritical. But as a positive
matter it makes perfect sense, for there is no nation able to enforce a more restrictive
human rights regime on the United States.
We do not mean to suggest that high-profile military or economic sanctions by
powerful governments are the only ways to enforce human rights law. Along many
points of diplomatic and economic interaction, more subtle, low-level sanctions can be
brought to bear on nations that abuse their citizens. These sanctions are facilitated by
the scores of international organizations devoted to exposing human rights abuses and
organizing interest groups to encourage powerful nations to enforce human rights.
These strategies make a difference, for some nations otherwise inclined to violate
international standards do take steps to avoid exposure of illegal acts, and often engage
in sporadic and nominal acts of compliance (such as releasing a dissident prisoner or
announcing new human rights aspirations). But the difference is usually small. And it
is in any event fully explained by sanctions that can be brought to bear on recalcitrant
nations rather than compliance with a norm of international law from a sense of legal
obligation.
V.

Conclusion

Henkin famously stated that “almost all nations observe almost all principles of
international law and almost all of their obligations all of the time.”281 If this is true as
applied to CIL, it is only because the principles of CIL are defined as ones that are
consistent with existing international behavior. Courts and scholars describe and
generalize what states and courts have done in the past. States and courts have done in
the past whatever served their national interest, so they would violate the “principles of
CIL” only if they irrationally decide to violate their interests or, more likely, their
interests have changed since the cases and actions described by treatise writes. Even
then, the states can be said to act consistently with CIL, because current actions can
usually be shown to be consistent with earlier actions by reinterpreting the hasty and
vague generalizations that jurists and courts make about CIL. Seizing a neutral ship
does not violate CIL because of an infinitely expandable exception for “contraband,”
“continuous voyage,” or “blockade.” Seizing a fishing vessel does not violate CIL
because of the exception for “military necessity” or because of ambiguities regarding
the size of the vessel. On the other side, if states in fact do not seize neutral ships or
280
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fishing vessels, the courts and scholars triumphantly claim that the state abide by
principles of CIL, even though in all likelihood the states would engage in the same
actions even if no one had ever heard of CIL.
In our view, CIL scholars approach international law exactly backwards. They think
that CIL exists “out there” and states must decide whether to comply with it or violate
it. They imagine their task to be discovering what CIL is, in order to determine what
states should do. The problem with this view is that one can discover what CIL is only
by looking at what states actually do. One evaluates a state’s action by looking at CIL,
but one determines CIL by looking at states’ actions. The circularity of this project can
be escaped only by giving precedence to earlier behavior. But the standard account of
CIL never explains why the current behavior of states should be controlled by their
behavior, or the behavior of other states, that occurred ten or fifty or one hundred years
ago.
Far more fruitful, we think, is the approach that we have described in this Article.
We start with the assumption that states act in their perceived national interest. This
assumption is not unknown in the international law literature. Not all international law
scholars are starry-eyed about the motives of the state. Some do believe that selfinterested states can cooperate. We agree, but we are also more skeptical and, we hope,
more rigorous. Whereas they believe that somehow these self-interested states feels
constrained by CIL, we insist that when states do achieve joint gains, and establish
behavioral regularities that display law-like patterns, the most plausible explanation
can be found in the bilateral coordination and prisoner’s dilemma models. We also
insist that a careful attention to the historical record reveals that most instances of
supposed cooperation or law-like behavior are best explained as coincidence of interest
or successful coercion. CIL scholars tend to be too optimistic about empirical reality
and too pessimistic about theory. International cooperation, at least as reflected in CIL,
is not as robust as they imagine. But it is still possible for self-interested states to
cooperate in the absence of external constraints.
Modern CIL scholarship occupies the position that domestic legal scholarship held a
century ago. Heavy reliance on cases and treatises gives scholars a distorted picture of
actual state practices, and encourages them to dissipate their energies disentangling
themselves from the musty threads of doctrine. They occupy a mirror-world in which
cases cite scholars citing scholars’ citations of cases. Where there is now arid
generalization, there should be a disciplined search for hypotheses that can be tested
against the facts. A literature built on the foundations of wishful thinking cannot
withstand the winds of skepticism. What CIL scholarship needs, three quarters of a
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century after a similar development in domestic legal scholarship, is a dose of legal
realism.
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